Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.     

Why managers divest—Evidence from New Zealand's largest companies

Chief Executives from New Zealand's largest companies were surveyed to distinguish divesting and nondivesting companies, and to identify the relative importance of the factors and motives which led to the divestment of 208 business units in the period 1985 through 1990. The divesting companies were considerably larger and faster growing than nondivestors. The typical divestment was motivated by the need to convert unattractive assets into liquid form which could then be held to strengthen the balance sheet, or reinvested in either the core business or new areas.     

Monetary policy in the transition to a market economy: The case of Hungary

In the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, monetary policy played a subordinate role, there were no capital-market institutions and the banking system was single-tier. All this has to be changed in the transition to a market economy. The example of Hungary, which abolished the traditional system of central planning as early as 1968, shows some of the pitfalls to be avoided.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.     

Countries and their products: A cognitive structure perspective

This research reports on consumers’ cognitive structures for countries and their products. In-depth personal interviews identified respondents’ knowledge, beliefs, myths, and other relevant cognitions related to a diverse set of 11 countries and their products. Derived cognitive dimensions were analyzed via correspondence analysis, and the 11 countries were subsequently grouped into five sets, or cognitive categories. In addition to the empirical findings, the article introduces the concept of country equity as a new way of thinking about global brands and discusses managerial implications related thereto. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, and elsewhere. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of International Business Studies, California Management Review, and others. He is the coauthor of two marketing research textbooks and has published in leading marketing and social psychological journals.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.