University patents,R&D competition,and social welfare

Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.     

Shadow economy and unemployment rate in USA: is there a structural relationship? An empirical analysis

This article aims to estimate the size of the US shadow economy (SE) using a structural equation approach and to evaluate if a structural relationship exists between the SE and the unemployment rate (UR) in the United States. The size of the SE is estimated to be decreasing over the last two decades. We corroborate the existence of a structural relationship between the SE and the UR by using a simple theoretical model. Furthermore, we extend the Okun's law to estimate the structural relationship between growth rate of official GDP, SE and UR. Our results indicate a significant positive relationship between the SE and the UR.     

Market clearing and derivative pricing

Summary. We develop a method of assigning unique prices to derivative securities, including options, in the continuous-time finance model developed in Raimondo (2001). In contrast with the martingale method of valuing options, which cannot distinguish among infinitely many possible option pricing processes for a given underlying securities price process when markets are dynamically incomplete, our option prices are uniquely determined in equilibrium in closed form as a function of the underlying economic data.Received: 14 April 2003, Revised: 7 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: G13, D52.This paper is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, whose strength and character we greatly admire. We are very grateful to Darrell Duffie, Steve Evans, Botond Koszegi, Roger Purves, Jacob Sagi, Chris Shannon, Bill Zame and an anonymous refereee for very helpful discussions and comments. The work of both authors was supported by Grant SES-9710424, and Andersons work was supported by Grant SES-0214164, from the National Science Foundation.     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are affected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term—logit distribution—one is able to calculate exactly the stationary distribution of the perturbed Markov process for any level of noise. We show that the stationary distribution places the largest probability on the maximizers of weighted sums of the agents’ (intrinsic) utilities, and this probability tends to 1 as noise vanishes.     

Formal and informal external linkages and firms�� innovative strategies. A cross-country comparison

Firms increasingly rely upon external actors for their innovation process. Interaction with these actors may occur formally (i.e. through a collaboration agreement) or informally (i.e. external actors acts as sources of information). We analyze the reasons why firms consider it to be important to develop formal and informal external linkages in the innovation process by looking at the role played by firms’ innovative strategies and by taking into account the possibility that a complementarity or substitutive relationship might exist between formal and informal linkages. Data are from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3), where we have access to firm level micro-data from Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK.     

Environmental Product Differentiation and Environmental Awareness

In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers (green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it. Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the positive market effect.      

On the performance of the Chow-Lin procedure for quarterly interpolation of annual data: Some Monte-Carlo analysis

Most of the countries of the OECD offer quarterly estimates of their national growth or of their Gross National Product. Official Statistical Agencies in western countries have to deal with the problem of estimating Quarterly National Accounts series congruently with Annual National Accounts. In Spain, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística uses the Chow-Lin disaggregation method, which is based on information provided by a group of high-frequency related variables, to estimate the quarterly components of National Accounts from annual components. In this paper, we analyse the relative quality of the estimates obtained through the Chow-Lin procedure, under different sets of hypotheses.JEL Classification: C15, C43, M40We are grateful to Maria Amparo Ripoll for her assistance. The authors also wish to thank three anonymous referees and an editor for their constructive suggestions and comments. This research was partially made during the stay of the first author at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. It has been partially supported by the research project DGCYT PB98-1460.     

Honesty in Environmental Regulation

This paper analyzes the determination of the optimal environmental regulatory policy under imperfect competition when the firms differ in their polluting technologies and degree of honesty. We show that more honesty does not necessarily imply lower social losses. The effect of honesty in social welfare depends not only on the degree of honesty measured by the proportion of honest firms and their particular cost features but also on the industry structure.     

Short- and long-run heterogeneous investment dynamics

In this paper, we model the dynamics of business investment taking into account asset-specific characteristics potentially affecting the reactivity of aggregate and disaggregate capital accumulation over the business cycle. We estimate Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and traditional investment (non-ICT) determinants within a Vector Error Correction Model testing the assumptions of the flexible accelerator and neoclassical model as well as the role of financial constraints and uncertainty. We evaluate our model on Italian data over the period 1980–2012, and we check our results also with Spanish and UK data. Our findings support the assumption that capital is heterogeneous since short- and long-run determinants are significantly different across the assets. Traditional assets experience stock adjustment costs while ICT investment incurs flow adjustment cost. In the short run, liquidity is a key determinant of investment independently of the asset type. In the long run, uncertainty significantly affects ICT. Finally, the results of the counterfactual exercises support the idea that ICT is a key policy variable to foster economic growth.