中国成品油市场月度分析

回顾 1.需求 9月份,中国固定资产投资及工业增加值同比增速继续放慢,但采矿、冶金、制造业、交通等主要耗能行业的投资和生产增长依然旺盛,而且出口增长强劲,推动石油需求继续走高.估计当月石油平均消费水平上升到约93.96万吨/日,同比增长6.91%.成品油消费逐步走向旺季,其中汽油需求随着运输、旅行等活动的日益增加,特别是"十一"长假期的临近,比上月有明显增长;而柴油需求也随着从南到北逐步进入"三秋"农忙季节以及沿海渔期生产活动的恢复开始走向秋季消费高峰.月中台风"姗姗"在渤海、黄海登陆,对华东、华北、东北沿海地区渔业、农业、基建和运输业造成一定程度的影响,不仅降低了部分油品需求,而且还造成油品出港不畅及到港缓慢.估计9月份国内汽油需求达到14.53万吨/日,比上月上升4.54%,同比增长3.66%;柴油需求为31.96万吨/日,比上月上升1.17%,同比增长7.48%;需求的柴汽比为2.17(见表1).     

中国成品油市场月度分析

回顾 1.需求 在中国政府持续的宏观经济调控政策的影响下,10月份国内固定资产投资增长继续回落,但经济增长依然旺盛,特别是出口增长出乎意料地强劲.大多数地区工农渔业生产处于旺季,但受国庆长假的影响,估计10月份石油平均消费水平比上月略有下降,至93.97万吨/日,同比增长6.96%.从油品市场看,由于高温天气全面结束以及煤炭运输计划的缩减,汽油需求较9月份有所回落;农业、渔业及工程建设用柴油需求进入高峰季节,但个别地区柴油市场受到国庆长假和走私油的影响.估计10月份国内汽油需求为14.10万吨/日,比上月下降0.89%,同比增长8.42%;柴油需求为32.76万吨/日,比上月上升2.50%,同比增长6.29%;需求的柴汽比为2.27(见表1).     

Making visions visible for long-term landscape management

Results generated by planning and futures studies are often too abstract to provide a clear vision of the future to non-specialists. In this study the role of 3D visualization and the challenges in developing and communicating visible visions for our future landscapes is explored. While traditional visualization techniques have been well-known for several hundreds of years digital 3D visualizations are still not yet taken advantage of in long-term planning or in futures studies in general to their full potential. As part of an iterative consultation and participation process a long-term vision for the landscape and land management of the Alport Valley in the Peak District National Park, UK is developed in order to improve the valley's special landscape character, to enhance the valley's visual and recreational attractiveness, to regenerate the woodlands in ways that maximize the long-term benefit of ecology, wildlife and landscape and to get a good balance between wooded areas and open moorland.An early integration of 3D visualization in the planning process offers a wide range of opportunities for exploring alternative futures but it also poses challenges to the expert planners such as being able to react timely, with a high degree of realism and interactively to incorporate new inputs from participating stakeholders. Furthermore, the planner is forced to translate a vision into concrete geographically referenced data. Only then the vision can be visualized. The full potential of 3D visualizations in the planning disciplines and in futures studies is still to be explored. The visualizations could be the basis to communicate the vision - the views of the future - and to share the vision with others in order to influence future change.     

The auditor’s strategy selection for negotiation with management: Flexibility of initial accounting position and nature of the relationship

The audit partner is usually the first mover in a negotiation with client management and has an intended strategy set going into such a negotiation. Negotiation strategies that make up the set may be integrative (both parties can gain or at least not lose) and distributive (there is a winner and a loser). We focus on five strategies: two integrative (expanding the agenda or problem solving) and three distributive (contending, conceding or compromising) and measure the audit partner’s intent to use these strategies’ associated tactics. We report the results of an audit negotiation experiment in which 140 highly experienced audit partners planned a negotiation in response to a case scenario that incorporated two key theoretical variables: the flexibility of the client initial accounting position and the nature of the prior relationship between the auditor and client management. In addition to intended tactics, we also examine these two variables’ effects on commitment to the goal of reducing net income. Our results indicate that in contrast to findings in the generic negotiation literature that show negotiators have a preference for distributive tactics and have difficulty employing integrative ones, our audit partners generally favored the use of integrative tactics over distributive ones when entering negotiations, irrespective of circumstance. However, the two theorized variables led to particular strategic choices when distributive tactics were intended; for example, when the audit partner perceived he or she was facing a client management that was inflexible in its initial accounting position, the partner was more likely to use contending tactics and less likely to use conceding and compromising tactics. Finally, we discuss implications of these results for practice and research.     

The economic function of credit rating agencies – What does the watchlist tell us?

Credit rating agencies do not only disclose simple ratings but announce watchlists (rating reviews) and outlooks as well. This paper analyzes the economic function underlying the review procedure. Using Moody’s rating data between 1982 and 2004, we find that for borrowers of high creditworthiness, rating agencies employ watchlists primarily in order to improve the delivery of information. For low-quality borrowers, in contrast, the review procedure seems to have developed into an implicit contract á la Boot et al. (2006), inducing the companies “on watch” to abstain from risk-augmenting actions. The agencies’ economic role hence appears to have been enhanced from a pure information certification towards an active monitoring function.     

Persistence and the four‐factor model in the Australian funds market: a note

We investigate whether Australian fund managers are able to deliver persistent performance using Carhart’s (1997) four‐factor model. Short‐ and long‐term persistence is examined and the sample is also divided into unit trusts and superannuation funds. We do not find evidence of persistence in any sample of funds. We find that winner (loser) funds tend to hold past winner (loser) stocks. Winner and loser unit trusts both appear to have positive exposure to small stocks.     

Socially responsible investment fund performance: the impact of screening intensity

Perhaps the most common criticism of socially responsible investment funds is that imposing non‐financial screens restricts investment opportunities, reduces diversification efficiencies and thereby adversely impacts performance. In this study we investigate this proposition and test whether the number of screens employed has a linear or curvilinear relation with return. Moreover, we analyse the link between screening intensity and risk. Screening intensity has no effect on unadjusted (raw) returns or idiosyncratic risk. However, we find a significant reduction in α of 70 basis points per screen using the Carhart performance model. Increased screening results in lower systematic risk – in line with managers choosing lower β stocks to minimize overall risk.     

An analysis of the reasons for the asymmetries surrounding earnings benchmarks

Several studies report an asymmetry in the distribution of earnings around specified benchmarks. However, doubt has arisen over whether the observed ‘kink’ in the distribution of earnings is solely caused by earnings management. We use a ratio analysis approach to examine a range of specific accruals for evidence of earnings management. We find little evidence that firms immediately above the benchmark have abnormal receivables, inventories or provisions. However, they do increase cash‐from‐customers and reduce inventory. Thus, our results support the recent research that suggests that firms engage in real actions to meet earnings benchmarks.     

The effect of political visibility on audit effort and audit pricing

This study examines whether auditors adjust their effort and pricing decisions for political visibility. We argue, from the behavioural literature, that political visibility will create the need for more justification by auditors. Using data on actual audit fees, hours and billing rates for a sample of New Zealand public sector companies, we find that total audit fees are positively related to the number of press mentions (our proxy for political visibility). Consistent with our expectations we find that audit fees are monotonically related to audit fees. We also find that auditors increase the hours spent on the audit but not billing rates, which further suggests defensive bolstering by auditors.