Delegation and dynamic incentives

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play‐hardball effect, which mitigates an efficient agent's ratchet incentive, and a carrot effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take‐the‐money‐and‐run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with production complementarity. We also consider different modes of commitment to yield insights into optimal organizational boundaries.     

What Determines Financial Development? Culture,Institutions or Trade

This paper endeavours to determine in how far theories emphasising cultural values, dysfunctional institutions or impediments to trade can explain the vast differences in the size of financial systems across the globe. To account for endogeneity, an instrumental variables approach is pursued. For a cross-section of countries, we find that trade openness and institutions constraining the political elite from expropriating financiers tend to promote financial development. Conversely, there is only limited evidence that cultural beliefs and the cost of enforcing financial contracts significantly hamper financial development. JEL no.  F36, G2, O16     

Functions of scenarios in transition processes

Given the interplaying tendencies of economic decline, social instability, and environmental depletion, any transition towards sustainable development faces a challenging task. To successfully cope with this complexity requires transition management. Integrated approaches for supporting sustainability transitions have been elaborated in the last years. Future studies and scenario construction are regarded as essential components in these approaches. However, the related studies in this field have focused either on a specific type of transition process, or on decision support in a different contextual process, or on a specific function of scenarios. Thus, an evaluation of the wide range of viewpoints on the functions of scenarios with respect to the requirements for transition management is still missing. In this paper, we systematically elaborate upon the functions for transition management that scenarios can fulfil. The developed concept is applied to five empirical scenario studies supporting transition processes on the national, regional and local level in Switzerland. The paper contributes to the development of a functional methodology of transition support, providing initial guidelines for answering the question of which method is appropriate for what type and phase of a transition process.     

Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship

We describe a principal–supervisor–agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion occurs in equilibrium. These contracts, however, are ex post inefficient and are only optimal if the principal can commit not to renegotiate. With renegotiation it is never optimal for the principal to prevent collusion and, at the same time, condition contracts on the signal. In fact, when the signal is informative enough collusion occurs in equilibrium.     

ECONOMIC BURDENS OF MARITAL DISRUPTIONS: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the German Socio-Economic Panel are used to show that women and children are worse off following a marital split than are men in both the United States and Germany. The size of the difference is sensitive to the equivalence scale used, but despite its far more extensive tax and transfer system the disparate impact of divorce or separation on women and children persisted in Germany at a level at least as high as in the United States.     

Optimal reserve composition in the presence of sudden stops

We analytically derive optimal central bank portfolios in a minimum variance framework with two assets and transaction demands caused by sudden stops in capital inflows. In this model, transaction demands become less important relative to traditional portfolio objectives as debt to reserve ratios decrease. We empirically estimate optimal dollar and euro shares for 23 emerging market countries and find that optimal reserve portfolios are dominated by anchor currencies and, at current debt-to-reserve ratios, introducing transaction demand has a relatively modest effect for most countries. We find that, in general, the dollar acts as a safe haven currency during sudden stops for country specific and global sudden stops, increasing the optimal share of dollar bonds in central bank portfolios. Correspondingly, our model predicts that dollar shares should decline as debt-to-reserve ratios fall, as observed in recent data. We also find that the denomination of foreign currency debt has little importance for optimal reserve portfolios.     

Global strategies of European firms

In this research four internationally operating business units of European multinational corporations are studied from a global strategy content perspective. In opposition to large parts of the existing global strategy literature, the observed pattern of strategic behavior exclusively related to neither prevailing generic strategies nor to any of the different content-oriented approaches to global strategy. Based on the empirical evidence, a taxonomy of four types of global strategies is identified. The taxonomy proposes to distinguish global strategies along two key dimensions: internal source of competitive advantage generation (upstream, downstream) and external focus of competitive advantage exploitation (country centered, country transcending).