Manufactured regional crises: The Middle East and North Africa under global food regimes

The current agrarian and food crisis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been interpreted through a number of tropes. Within the dominant mainstream discourse, the MENA region is often depicted as a homogenous geographical area characterized by dryness, infertile lands and poor water resources. How did imperialism, colonialism and the Cold War influence the MENA food systems? What were the effects of trade liberalization and neoliberalism on the agricultural systems in the region? These are some questions that this paper will try to answer using a geographical and historical-comparative analysis, through a food regimes lens. Understanding contemporary social relations dynamics cannot be limited to the recent period. Agriculture and food in the MENA region are anchored in the history of power relations ruled by flows of capital and the shaping of ecological transformations during the longue durée of capitalism and its corresponding modes of control and regulation.     

Trading and liquidity in the catastrophe bond market

We provide first insights into secondary market trading, liquidity determinants, and the liquidity premium of catastrophe bonds. Based on transaction data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), we find that cat bonds are traded less frequently during the hurricane season and more often close to maturity. Trading activity indicates that the market is dominated by brokers without a proprietary inventory. Liquidity is high in periods of high trading activity in the overall market and for bonds with low default risk or close to maturity, which results from lower order processing costs. Finally, using realized bid–ask spreads as a liquidity measure, we find that on average, 21% of the observable yield spread on the cat bond market is attributable to the liquidity premium, with a magnitude of up to 141 bps for high-risk bonds.     

Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*

We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determines the organization's overall efficiency. Under centralized communication, eliciting the agents' information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information. Under hierarchical communication, the principal concedes more information rent due to loss of control, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralized communication is optimal when such likelihood is low. Hierarchical communication, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.     

Technological changes in the era of digitalization: What do collective agreements tell us?

Unionized organizations are implementing more than ever technological changes to cope with an increasingly changing and highly digital environment. Despite the extensive literature on union responses to changes, there is not much evidence on how unions and employers draft provisions pertaining to technological changes in collective agreements. Therefore, this paper aims to conduct an in-depth analysis of these provisions in over 500 collective agreements signed between 2000 and 2020. Specifically, this study focuses on office workers in two of the most important Canadian industries, namely, the healthcare and manufacturing sectors. The findings indicate that within the examined provisions, the regulation of technological change varies along a continuum that extends from no obligations to stringent obligations on the part of the employer. Moreover, the results show that these provisions have remained stable over the past two decades.     

Group cooperation of village officials in Chinese rural resettlement: A lab in the field

We examine decisions made by village officials in a public goods game and their impact on villagers' attitudes toward a resettlement project in seven rural villages in China. The data comes from two sources: (i) a laboratory experiment with village officials, and (ii) a survey of villagers. Villages whose officials exhibited more cooperative behavior in the laboratory reported higher support levels from the villagers. We find that teams with higher average contribution levels in the PGG game relayed the resettlement news to their villagers earlier than other teams and also possess greater altruistic preferences.     

Feature-weighted categorized play across symmetric games

Experimental Economics - Experimental game theory studies the behavior of agents who face a stream of one-shot games as a form of learning. Most literature focuses on a single recurring identical...