Generic functions of railway stations—A conceptual basis for the development of common system understanding and assessment criteria

The redevelopment of railway stations calls for the integration of many different objectives. Two crucial challenges thereby are the development of a common system understanding among the multiple stakeholders with potentially conflicting interests and the structured definition of comprehensive assessment criteria. Defining the functions of the system railway station, i.e. discussing what the system should do, can support solving these challenges. Based on a review of Swiss railway stations in a transdisciplinary research project applying four focus groups (n=38), 28 expert interviews and two expert workshops, we present a structured framework of five generic functions of railway stations and their interdependencies. The five generic functions are: linking catchment area and transport network, supporting transfer between modes of transport, facilitating commercial use of real estate, providing public space, and contributing to the identity of the surrounding area. Potential conflicts between functions are identified. They concern the competition of multiple functions for space, for customer attention or for revenues as well as increasing system complexities with station size. We illustrate how the framework of functions can be used to foster a common system understanding and to develop assessment criteria. Although elaborated from a Swiss perspective the framework is perceived adaptable to railway stations of other countries.     

Can money endogeneity be generalized? Empirical evidence from Caribbean economies

This study investigates the direction of causality between the money supply and reserve money for some selected Caribbean countries using recently developed techniques of causality tests. The findings suggest that neither money endogeneity nor money exogeneity can be generalized to all small, open economies. The causal patterns may differ according to whether the monetary arrangements of the countries follow either a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime. Moreover, this-study highlights the fact that a mixed bag of policies must be implemented by respective central banks to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

Attitudes towards immigration—Perceived consequences and economic self-interest

Using the European Social Survey 2002/3, we develop a new test of whether economic self-interest influences people's attitudes towards immigration, exploiting that people have widely different perceptions of the consequences of immigration.     

Specialization and Welfare in the Presence of Imperfectly Integrated Capital Markets and Learning-by-doing

We study a two-sector, two-period model with learning externalities in the modern sector and imperfectly integrated capital markets. We find that higher capital market integration lowers the requirements on the learning pattern necessary for free trade to lead to an equilibrium with maximal specialization in modern sector activities. We further find that the equilibrium with maximal specialization in modern sector activities Pareto dominates, if it exists, any other free trade equilibrium, and that autarky can Pareto dominate free trade if capital markets are poorly integrated, even when there is maximal specialization in modern sector activities under free trade.

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Rent seeking and aid effectiveness

We introduce foreign aid and a rent seeking contest for public funds into the Barro (JPE 1990) growth model. We find that aid effectiveness depends on fiscal policies, the level of aid inflows and the quality of institutions that restrict appropriation of public funds by rent seeking agents. These results can be shown to be consistent with the best established findings in the empirical literature on aid effectiveness. Rent seeking may thus indeed be a major determinant of aid effectiveness. We further discuss how aid effectiveness depends on the way foreign aid is disbursed and on the determinants of institutional quality. JEL Classification F35 · D72 · D9 · H2     

The case for freedom revisited

I argue that the case for freedom is about either knowledge or incentives. Freedom optimises the production and use of knowledge, and gives people the right incentives. I trace the history of these arguments. Knowledge‐based justifications can be found in the writings of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Wilhelm von Humboldt, J. S. Mill, Friedrich von Hayek, and Karl Popper. Incentive‐based arguments are due to Thomas Aquinas, Adam Smith, and James Mill. I then go on to query the extent to which classical freedom is compatible with other aims such as efficiency, enforcement of contracts, freedom of choice, political participation, and the socialist concept of freedom. Finally, I reject natural selection as a justification of freedom or of the right of property.     

Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency‐theory explanation

Moral hazard can hinder both the realization and the effectiveness of research and development (R&D) supply relations. However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies investigating the determinants of moral hazard under the specific circumstances of R&D supply relations. Based on a study on 104 cases, this article will help to fill that gap. The results not only confirm information asymmetries as determinants, as predicted by principal‐agent theory, but also reveal surprising effects of additional factors. Thus, we show that the general explanation of moral hazard needs to be adapted to the specifics of a concrete exchange situation.     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.