EQUITY CORRELATIONS IMPLIED BY INDEX OPTIONS: ESTIMATION AND MODEL UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS

We propose a method for constructing an arbitrage‐free multiasset pricing model which is consistent with a set of observed single‐ and multiasset derivative prices. The pricing model is constructed as a random mixture of N reference models, where the distribution of mixture weights is obtained by solving a well‐posed convex optimization problem. Application of this method to equity and index options shows that, whereas multivariate diffusion models with constant correlation fail to match the prices of index and component options simultaneously, a jump‐diffusion model with a common jump component affecting all stocks enables to do so. Furthermore, we show that even within a parametric model class, there is a wide range of correlation patterns compatible with observed prices of index options. Our method allows, as a by product, to quantify this model uncertainty with no further computational effort and propose static hedging strategies for reducing the exposure of multiasset derivatives to model uncertainty.     

The short-term timing of initial public offerings

This paper examines the effect of stock market conditions on the waiting time of initial public offering (IPO) candidates, from the date firms file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the effective IPO date. I find that issuers are going public faster when time-varying stock market valuations are high, and when time-varying market returns and time-varying market volatility are low. The volatility effect is not driven by regulatory delays consecutive to changes in the terms of the offers during the IPO process. Taken together, these results indicate that firms use a short-term market timing strategy when deciding the right time to go public and are consistent with a real option interpretation of IPO timing.     

Robustness and sensitivity analysis of risk measurement procedures

Measuring the risk of a financial portfolio involves two steps: estimating the loss distribution of the portfolio from available observations and computing a ‘risk measure’ that summarizes the risk of the portfolio. We define the notion of ‘risk measurement procedure’, which includes both of these steps, and introduce a rigorous framework for studying the robustness of risk measurement procedures and their sensitivity to changes in the data set. Our results point to a conflict between the subadditivity and robustness of risk measurement procedures and show that the same risk measure may exhibit quite different sensitivities depending on the estimation procedure used. Our results illustrate, in particular, that using recently proposed risk measures such as CVaR/expected shortfall leads to a less robust risk measurement procedure than historical Value-at-Risk. We also propose alternative risk measurement procedures that possess the robustness property.     

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

While mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) increase competition in the mobile telecommunications industry, granting market access to MVNOs may have unwanted consequences. In particular, infrastructure investment by incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) may be smaller. This paper examines the effects of MVNO entry and access regulation on the investment behavior of MNOs. It uses firm-level data for 58 MNOs in 21 OECD countries during 2000–2008. The results suggest that mandated provision of access is related to lower investment intensity of MNOs, while voluntary access provision has no effect. Although reduced investment incentives do not necessarily correspond to under-investment, this underscores the need for those countries where MVNOs are provided access to address the issue of investment incentives.     

The Collusion-deterring Effect of Pre-attributed Supplies and the Hog Auction in Quebec

The hog/pork industry in Quebec has been going through major institutional changes since 1989, the year an electronic auction was put in place to market all of the hogs in the province. Because the auction's ability to generate high prices did not meet the expectations of hog producers, the pure auction system was replaced by a hybrid one in 1994. In this system, most of the hog supply was pre-attributed to processors at a negotiated price based on the US. price while the remainder of the provincial supply of hogs was sold through the auction. In this paper, we investigate how a seemingly inefficient marketing mechanism like pre-attributions can increase the efficiency of a usually efficient mechanism like an auction. We present theoretical arguments regarding the sustainability of collusion under the pure auction and hybrid systems in addition to analyzing auction prices with modern time series tools.     

Output and Price Determination in the Canadian Chicken Industry: Which Should Come First?

Bilateral bargaining between chicken producers and processing firms determined chicken prices in Ontario from 1995 to 2002. A significant reform in 2003 introduced a formula‐based live price that is a function of chicken producers' costs. The latter pricing mechanism reduces the risk faced by processing firms and producers because the chicken price is known when output decisions are made. However, the pricing formula also involves some risk in that the cost components may be far removed from actual costs when production is carried out. Expected farm prices under the two different pricing mechanisms are also not identical. The producers' and processors' expected utility of profits under each pricing mechanism is computed. The bargaining pricing mechanism generally yields higher expected utility for producers than the formula‐based price. Conversely, processing firms obtain a higher expected utility under the formula‐based pricing than under the bargaining framework. These conclusions critically hinge on the size of the producers' margin component in the formula‐based price. In that sense, the formula‐based pricing mechanism did not lessen the significance of relative bargaining strengths in establishing the distribution of welfare in the chicken industry. Des négociations bilatérales entre les producteurs de poulet et les entreprises de transformation déterminaient le prix du poulet vivant en Ontario de 1995 à 2002. Une formule de prix établie en fonction des coûts de production des producteurs de poulet fut introduite en 2003. Ce mécanisme réduit le risque auquel sont confrontés les transformateurs et les producteurs parce que le prix du poulet vivant est connu lorsque les décisions de production sont prises. Cependant, la formule de prix comporte aussi un risque dans le sens où la composante du coût dans la formule de prix peut être différente des coûts réels de production du poulet vivant. Les prix espérés du poulet vivant sont aussi différents dans les deux systèmes de prix. L'utilité espérée des profits pour les producteurs et les transformateurs de poulet est calculée dans les deux mécanismes. Le modèle fondé sur la négociation génère une utilité espérée des profits plus élevée pour les producteurs que la formule de prix. À l'inverse, les transformateurs obtiennent une utilité espérée des profits plus élevée selon la formule de prix que selon le modèle fondé sur la négociation. Ces conclusions sont étroitement liées à la taille de la marge des producteurs utilisée dans le calcul de la formule de prix. Dans ce sens, l'introduction d'un nouveau mécanisme de détermination des prix n'a pas modifié l'importance du pouvoir relatif de négociation dans la distribution du surplus économique au sein de la filière canadienne du poulet.     

Efficacitè technique et coûts de production dans les secteurs laitiers du Québec et de l'Ontario

This study aims to estimate the level of technical efficiency in milk production and to analyze the relationship between the costs of production, the level of technical efficiency and farm size. Furthermore, the socio-economic variables that characterize the most efficient farms and those producing at lower cost are identified. The results indicate that in Quebec, the level of technical efficiency increases with herd size, but this increase is very small. In Ontario, herd size is not significant to explain technical efficiency. The level of education, the participation in milk recording programs, expenditures per cow fort are and artificial insemination, the quality of hay and the number of years as member of a management club are a11 variables that characterize efficient farms.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Net neutrality and asymmetric platform competition

Journal of Regulatory Economics - In this paper we analyze the interplay between access to the last-mile network and net neutrality in the market for Internet access. We consider two competing...     

Do people really want to be informed? Ex-ante evaluations of information-campaign effectiveness

Experimental Economics - We develop a method to assess population knowledge about any given topic. We define, and rationalize, types of beliefs that form the ‘knowledge spectrum’. Using...