DYNAMIC STATUS EFFECTS,SAVINGS, AND INCOME INEQUALITY

This article advances the hypothesis that the intensity of status preferences depends negatively on the average wealth of society (endogenous dynamic status effect), in accordance with empirical evidence. Our theory replicates the contradictory historical facts of an increasing saving rate along with declining returns to capital over time. By affecting the dynamics of the saving rate, the dynamic status effect raises inequality, thereby providing a behavioral mechanism for the observed diverse dynamics of income inequality across countries. In countries in which the dynamic status effect is strong (weak), inequality rises (declines) over time in response to a positive productivity shock.     

Emotional and interpersonal competencies and leader development

A variety of recent leader development programs have focused on improving leaders' emotional and interpersonal competencies. Decades of leadership research suggest that these “people skills” are crucial for leader effectiveness. This paper reviews the history of these leader development programs as well as research on emotional and interpersonal competencies. Suggestions for grounding leader development programs in sound research on emotional and social competencies, as well as an agenda for future research on the development of leader emotional and interpersonal skills, are provided.     

Catching up: The role of demand, supply and regulated price effects on the real exchange rates of four accession countries

The main aim of this paper is to examine the exchange rate behaviour of a group of four transitional, EU accession countries, with a view to making policy recommendations regarding their full accession to the European Monetary Union. We employ a dynamic OLS panel estimator to investigate the relative importance of demand and supply influences on the exchange rates of these countries. Our analysis shows that both supply‐ and demand‐side effects are important for the accession countries, although their overall effect on inflation differentials and competitiveness seems to be small. An additional focus of the paper is the examination of the role that administrated, or regulated, prices and the productivity of the distribution sector play in the real exchange rate dynamics. Using a unique database we show that administrative prices have been a powerful force behind price and real exchange developments for our group of accession countries. The distribution sector is shown to have an independent effect on the internal price ratio over and above that generated by the Balassa–Samuelson effect.     

Asymmetric FDI and tax-treaty bargaining: theory and evidence

Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This theory is then tested using 1992 data from US and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.     

Fixed Costs, Foreign Direct Investment, and Gravity with Zeros

Fixed costs play a crucial role in current models of foreign direct investment (FDI), yet they are almost entirely ignored in empirical treatments of FDI. We fill this gap by using a 1989–2001 panel of FDI flows into Iceland to examine the determinants of fixed costs for multinational firms and how these influence aggregate patterns of investment. Our additions to research in the field include usage of several natural-resource variables, and the analysis of data on initial entry of FDI into a developed country. We use the Heckman two-step procedure, which allows us to account for fixed costs and their impact on estimation. Taken together, we find that the standard OLS approach to the data incorrectly links the quantity of FDI to source-country variables while in fact most of their role is in determining whether FDI takes place at all.     

Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings–van den Elzen, Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.     

Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players

We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players’ preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18(2):141–153, 1989), our definitions capture the intuition that players may consider the possibility of slight arbitrary mistakes. This generalizes the idea leading to trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as introduced in Selten (Int J Game Theory 4(1):25–55, 1975), by allowing for ambiguous trembles characterized by sets of distributions. We prove existence for two of our equilibrium notions and relate our definitions to standard equilibrium concepts with expected utility maximizing players. Our analysis shows that ambiguity aversion can lead to behavioral implications that are distinct from those attained under expected utility maximization, even if ambiguous beliefs only arise from the possibility of slight mistakes in the implementation of unambiguous strategies.     

Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.