Session I: Corporate Purpose and Governance

In this first of five sessions of a recent Columbia Law School symposium devoted to discussion of his new book, Prosperity—and The Purpose of the Corporation, Oxford University's Colin Mayer begins by calling for a “radical reinterpretation” of the corporate mission. For all but the last 50 or so of its 2,000‐year history, the corporation has combined commercial activities with a public purpose. But since Milton Friedman's famous pronouncement in 1970 that the social goal of the corporation is to maximize its own profits, the gap between the social and private interests served by corporations appears to have grown ever wider, helping fuel the global outbreaks of populist protest and indictments of capitalism that fill today's media. In Mayer's reinterpretation, the boards of all companies will produce and publish statements of corporate purpose that envision some greater social good than maximizing shareholder value. To that end, he urges companies to make continuous investments of their financial capital and other resources in developing other forms of corporate capital—human, social, and natural—and to account for such investments in the same way they now account for their investments in physical capital. Although the author appears to prefer that such changes be mandatory, enacted through new legislation and enforced by regulators and the courts, his main efforts are directed at persuading the largest institutional owners of corporations—many of whom are already favorably predisposed to ESG—to support these corporate initiatives. Marty Lipton, after expressing enthusiasm about Mayer's proposals, suggests that mandating such changes is likely neither feasible nor desirable, but that attempts—like his own New Paradigm—to gain the acceptance and support of large shareholders is the most promising strategy. Ron Gilson, on the other hand, after voicing Lipton's skepticism about the enforceability of such statements of purpose, issues a number of warnings. One is about the political risks associated with ever more concentrated ownership of public companies in a world where populist distrust of all concentrations of wealth and power is clearly on the rise. But most troubling for the company themselves is the confusion such proposals could create for corporate boards whose responsibility is to limit two temptations facing corporate managements: short‐termism, or underinvestment in the corporate future to boost near‐term earnings (and presumably stock prices); and what Gilson calls hyperopia, or overinvestment designed to preserve growth (and management's jobs) at all costs.     

Downside risk and the size of credit spreads

We investigate why spreads on corporate bonds are so much larger than expected losses from default. Systematic factors make very little contribution to spreads, even if higher moments or downside effects are taken into account. Instead we find that sizes of spreads are strongly related to idiosyncratic-risk factors: not only to idiosyncratic equity volatility, but even more to idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk. Idiosyncratic bond volatility helps to explain spreads because it reflects not just the distribution of firm value but is also a proxy for liquidity risk. Idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk adds to this by capturing the left-skewness of the firm-value distribution. We confirm our results both for the initial 1997-2004 sample period and also out of sample for 2005-2009, which includes the sub-prime crisis. Overall, credit spreads are large because they incorporate a large risk premium related to investors’ fears of extreme losses.     

Portfolio selection with mental accounts and delegation

Das et al. (2010) develop an elegant framework where an investor selects portfolios within mental accounts but ends up holding an aggregate portfolio on the mean-variance frontier. This investor directly allocates the wealth in each account among available assets. In practice, however, investors often delegate the task of allocating wealth among assets to portfolio managers who seek to beat certain benchmarks. Accordingly, we extend their framework to the case where the investor allocates the wealth in each account among portfolio managers. Our contribution is threefold. First, we provide an analytical characterization of the existence and composition of the optimal portfolios within accounts and the aggregate portfolio. Second, we present conditions under which such portfolios are not on the mean-variance frontier, and conditions under which they are. Third, we show that the aforementioned analytical characterization is also applicable within the framework of Das et al. and thus improves upon their numerical approach.     

Evolutionary economics and the markets-as-networks approach

The paper analyzes the similarities and differences between the markets-as-networks (or IMP) tradition in industrial marketing and evolutionary economics. Five analytical dimensions are used: unit of analysis, methodological practice, core frameworks and models, key assumptions, and theoretical antecedents and origins. Evolutionary ideas have long been incorporated into economic theorizing. This paper concentrates on the new evolutionary economics associated particularly with a research tradition centred on the work of Nelson and Winter [Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S.G. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press]. There are several important parallels between this research tradition and the IMP or markets-as-networks tradition. It is proposed that the markets-as-networks tradition could be enriched by seeking explicitly to incorporate elements of an evolutionary process into the dynamics of change within inter-firm relationships and networks. Evolutionary economics would benefit from explicit consideration of the likelihood that inter-organizational routines, rather than individual firm-based routines, play an important part in the evolutionary process.     

Sustainability and comovement of government debt in EMU Countries: A panel data analysis

We investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 19 European Monetary Union (EMU) countries over the period 1970–2016. Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-section dependence show that the government debt series is stationary, indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for these countries. This confirms the effectiveness of the austerity measures implemented by these member states. Moreover, an unobserved common factor drives the comovement of government debt in the Eurozone.