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41.
This study characterizes a systematic relationship between the diversification incentives and the market structure of the mutual funds industry with investors differentiated by their attitude towards risk. With sufficiently low competition the subgame perfect portfolio equilibrium exhibits maximal risk differentiation. With intensified competition intermediate funds, i.e., those attracting investors with intermediate attitudes towards risk, select diversified portfolios. Finally, we offer a general characterization of how imperfect competition between risk-differentiated funds will generate an equilibrium relationship between risk and expected returns. 相似文献
42.
远期付款交单是一种商业信用,出口商的收汇安全主要取决于进口商的信用.在当前金融危机下,各国贸易保护主义抬头,政策多变、进口商破产增加,使出口商的收汇遇到更多的国家风险和进口商的信用风险.因此出口商在选用远期付款交单进行结算时一定要增强风险防范意识,注意考察进口国的相关政策及进口商的资信情况并投保出口信用险以规避自身风险. 相似文献
43.
Kurt R. Brekke Luigi Siciliani Odd Rune Straume 《The Canadian journal of economics》2017,50(4):1063-1103
We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms. 相似文献
44.
Kurt R. Brekke Luigi Siciliani Odd Rune Straume 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(3):1019-1048
We study the incentives for quality provision and cost efficiency for hospitals with soft budgets, where the payer can cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. While a higher bailout probability reduces cost efficiency, the effect on quality is ambiguous. Profit confiscation reduces both quality and cost efficiency. First‐best is achieved by a strict no‐bailout and no‐profit‐confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices, a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare‐improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high‐cost patients. 相似文献
45.
We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of a such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific input suppliers, on the other hand, results are reversed. We apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an international oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised by cross-border merger. 相似文献
46.
We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher, resulting in higher steady-state levels of quality in the closed-loop solution than in the benchmark open-loop solution, if the price is sufficiently high. However, this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low (and below unit costs). Sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady-state quality. Prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated. 相似文献
47.
We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions. 相似文献
48.
We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries. 相似文献
49.
Rune Elvik 《Transport Policy》2010,17(3):196-204
This paper provides a restatement of the case for speed limits. The paper argues that driver speed choice cannot be granted any normative status (i.e. be regarded as optimal from a societal point of view) unless it is “objectively” rational, even if it can be reasonably interpreted as “subjectively” rational. A distinction between “subjective” and “objective” rationality is very rarely made in modern analyses relying on the theory of rational choice, but it makes sense with respect to the choice of speed. Studies that have assessed which impacts of speed drivers consider, whether drivers correctly assess these impacts, and how drivers coordinate their choice of speed with other drivers are reviewed. It is concluded that driver speed choice is not “objectively” rational. It is concluded that the lack of rationality in driver speed choice implies that this choice needs to be regulated by means of speed limits. 相似文献
50.
Kjell Erik Lommerud Trond E. Olsen Odd Rune Straume 《Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade》2010,10(2):161-186
We analyse how national taxation of firms is likely to affect merger incentives in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this then is an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce cross-border mergers by allowing the firms in question to play national policy makers out against each other, this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making. 相似文献