Noncompete agreements,training, and wage competition

We study the effects of noncompete agreements in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare. Firms earn higher profits and pay lower average wage when they require workers to sign noncompete agreements.     

Comparing Public and Private Sector Employees’ Innovative Behaviour: Understanding the role of job and organizational characteristics,job types,and subsectors

Abstract

Innovation is argued to be of key importance in the public sector. Little is known about possible sector differences in innovative behaviour. The stereotype in literature is that public employees are less innovative. We analyse whether sector is associated with innovative behaviour and the influence of job/organizational characteristics. We test this by using a three-country representative survey in Scandinavia with 8,310 respondents. We control for subsectors/industries and job functions. We do not find that public employees are less innovative. Furthermore, the study emphasizes the importance of understanding the major differences in innovative behaviour between different subsectors/industries and job types.     

University‐firm competition in basic research and university funding policy

We characterize equilibrium investments in basic research by the commercial and university sectors contingent on public funding of the university. We find that firms invest in basic research despite the opportunities for free riding and we present conditions under which firms even have incentives to augment the public funding to the university. We characterize the socially optimal volume of public funding for the university sector. Finally, we compare total investments in a mixed duopoly with those of duopolies composed of two universities as well as two profit‐maximizing firms.     

The impact of private vs. public ownership on the level and structure of employment

We examine the effects of private vs. public ownership on the level and structure of employment using uncommonly rich data on the population of Portuguese firms from 1991 to 2009. We find that private ownership is associated with sizeable job losses. This occurs whether we consider privatizations or nationalizations, and the relationship tends to be stronger in the presence of foreign capital. We also find some evidence that private ownership is associated with higher skill utilization, particularly following privatizations and when foreign investment is present. The estimated job losses associated with private ownership are consistent with a theory in which the shift in ownership increases the degree of profit orientation and leads to lower job security.     

Partial outsourcing, monitoring cost, and market structure

Abstract.  We investigate firms' outsourcing decisions when production requires a large number of inputs. The novelty of our approach is that it provides a testable framework to characterize the equilibrium fraction of outsourced inputs. We demonstrate that intensified competition in a Cournot market for the final good typically enlarges the set of outsourced components relative to those produced in‐house. The proportions of outsourced inputs are found to be strategic substitutes independently of whether firms compete with respect to quantities or prices in the market for the final good. JEL classification: D20, L22     

National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly

We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the firms will merge internationally in equilibrium. There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes. A “national champion” policy of promoting domestic mergers rather than international ones is nevertheless never optimal.     

Good Jobs,Bad Jobs and Redistribution*

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy‐maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a “good jobs” sector due to the capture of quasi‐rents by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for income equality, the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the policy‐maker may instead choose to tax investment.     

Profit Sharing,Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment*

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.     

How well do advertising images of health and beauty travel across cultures? A self‐concept perspective

This study is a cross‐cultural examination of the ideal self‐image of women in terms of health and beauty. The match‐up between two advertising beauty types (possible advertising presenters) and female consumers' ideal health and beauty images in terms of wanting to look like a specific model were tested with 750 female respondents from five European cities. The respondents also identified the ideal eye and hair colors for health and beauty. This quantitative study revealed cross‐cultural variation in ideal self‐image in terms of healthy and beautiful beauty types. International advertisers need to understand the important, contemporary, cultural characteristics of an ideal beauty type in terms of healthy or beautiful before developing standardized advertising communicating such appeals. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeoff between lending market competition and financial fragility. Such a tradeoff may not emerge either when banks compete by conditioning interest rates on investment volumes irrespectively of whether credit rationing takes place or not.