Positive and Negative Information Transfers from Management Forecasts

We examine positive and negative information transfers associated with management earnings and revenue forecasts. Positive information transfers are due to industry commonalities whereas negative information transfers are caused by competitive shifts. We argue that positive and negative intra-industry information transfers offset each other and lead to an overall finding of no information transfers even though they exist. We also conjecture that the type of information transfers from the same management forecast can be positive or negative based on the characteristics of the information receiver. We hypothesize positive information transfers to nonrival firms and negative information transfers to rivals. Consistent with our prediction, we find negative (positive) information transfers between forecasting firms and nonforecasting rival (nonrival) firms in the same industry. Through analyses using competitors identified by Hoover's and 10-K reports, we show more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms.     

Structural Error Correction Models: A System Method for Linear Rational Expectations Models and an Application to an Exchange Rate Model

This paper develops a system instrumental variable method to estimate the speed of adjustment coefficient in the long-run equilibrium of structural error correction models for a class of linear rational expectations models. This method is applied to an exchange rate model with sticky prices, in which the speed of adjustment coefficient governs the half-life of the real exchange rate. Compared to single equation methods, the system method gives smaller half-life estimates with sharper standard errors.     

A Fuzzy Cognitive Map-Based Bi-Directional Inference Mechanism: An Application to Stock Investment Analysis

The objective of this paper is to apply fuzzy cognitive map (FCM)-related techniques to (1) extract causal knowledge from a specific problem-domain, (2) construct a hierarchical knowledge base, and (3) perform a bi-directional inference. The causal knowledge base built by FCM can be described as a matrix form, guaranteeing mathematically compact operation compared with a production (if–then) knowledge base. Based on the causal knowledge base, we can break down a given decision problem into a multi-leveled one. Then bi-directional (downward or upward) inference can be applied to the multi-leveled problem to find a more robust solution. We applied our method to a stock investment analysis problem which is typical of highly unstructured problems in OR/MS fields. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation

This paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control. It is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance. Bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk. Utilizing the mean-variance model, the following results are shown: (a) the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks; (b) as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation, the “theoretically correct” risk weights under the risk-based capital plan are explicitly derived; and (c) the “theoretically correct” risk weights are restrictions on asset composition, which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms.     

Factors Influencing Organizational Performance in Gainsharing Programs

Using survey data from managers at 269 establishments in the United States and Canada, this article examines factors influencing outcomes of gainsharing. The ordered probit analyses generally indicated that these outcomes have significant associations with employee involvement, bonus payouts, employee bonus share, bonus group size, consultant involvement, the administration of employee votes, labor intensity, market situation, establishment's financial condition, the average seniority level of employees, union status, and union support.     

Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes

This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.