ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR DIETARY IMPROVEMENT AMONG FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS

Most Americans need to consume more fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. This need is particularly acute among low‐income individuals. This study examines the cost‐effectiveness of two economic policies that use alternative policy levers available within the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly Food Stamp Program) to increase consumption of these under‐consumed foods. Data from three nationally representative surveys are used to estimate demand elasticities, marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamp benefits, and consumption amount of and spending on under‐consumed foods among food stamp recipients. Results suggest that a 10% price subsidy would curtail consumption deficiencies by 4%–7% at an estimated cost of $734 million a year. When the same $734 million is used to finance food stamp benefits, consumption deficiencies are predicted to narrow by only 0.35%–0.40%. (JEL C34, D12, Q18)     

A SIMPLISTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF CORRUPTION

The author's simplistic view of corruption is that all politicians and government officials—like everyone else—are constrained self-maximizers. They therefore establish or maintain regulations and controls with the intent to facilitate corruption, which then becomes a source of income for them. Under private enterprise, where resources are transferable and movable, competition limits the ability to corrupt. However, in state enterprises, limiting corruption through competition is difficult. Corruption can help offset the inefficiencies of a communist or hierarchical system, as the economy makes a transition toward private property. But the danger is that corruption will become institutionalized and develop well-defined, transferable rights. Once that happens, the economy gets stuck there, as it has in India. Thus, in reforming a communist system—as that of China—into a private property system, gradualism will not do.     

Experimental Evidence of Market Reactions to New Consumption Taxes*

Abstract. Consumption taxes of various forms are of increasing importance worldwide. This study employs a laboratory market design to investigate differential market reactions to three consumption tax forms while holding all other factors constant. Ten laboratory markets were conducted, each involving nine volunteer participants. Market participants were randomly assigned to roles analogous to wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of a market good. The three tax forms were (1) a sales tax imposed on retail consumers of a commodity, (2) a gross-receipts tax imposed on retail sellers, and (3) a value-added tax imposed on sellers at two levels of production. At least three markets were conducted under each tax regime as a basis for experimental comparison. The tax rates used in each structure were chosen so that a competitive model would predict different equilibrium prices but the same tax burdens (the sum of explicit and implicit taxes) across the three tax regimes. Results generally support these predictions, with somewhat stronger support for equivalent tax revenues (explicit taxes collected) than for equivalent tax incidence (distribution of tax burdens after price adjustments). Observed tax incidence differences suggest that market agents who are called upon to explicitly pay taxes actually bear relatively lower tax burdens after implicit tax price adjustments. In general, however, price shifting is consistent with the competitive model, supporting the economic dictum that the choice among alternative designations of taxpaying agents is more a question of form than of economic substance. Résumé. Les taxes à la consommation revêtant diverses formes augmentent en importance à travers le monde. Les auteurs ont conçu un modèle de marché expérimental dans le but d'étudier les différentes réactions du marché à trois formes de taxe à la consommation, tout en maintenant constants l'ensemble des autres facteurs. Dix marchés expérimentaux ont été créés, chacun d'eux faisant intervenir neuf participants volontaires à qui étaient attribués aléatoirement des rôles analogues à ceux de grossistes, de détaillants ou de consommateurs d'un marché de produits. Les trois formes de taxe étaient les suivantes: (1) une taxe de vente s'appliquant aux consommateurs d'un bien sur le marché de détail, (2) une taxe sur les encaissements bruts s'appliquant aux détaillants et (3) une taxe sur la valeur ajoutée s'appliquant aux vendeurs, à deux échelons de production. Au moins trois marchés sous chaque régime fiscal ont servi de base de comparaison expérimentale. Les taux utilisés dans chaque structure ont été choisis de telle sorte qu'un modèle concurrentiel arrive à des prix d'équilibre différents mais à une fardeau fiscal identique (la somme des taxes explicites et implicites) sous les trois régimes. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus confirment ces prédictions, plus encore dans le cas des recettes fiscales équivalentes. Les différentes incidences fiscales observées donnent à penser que les agents du marché de qui l'on réclame explicitement des taxes supportent, en réalité, un fardeau fiscal relativement moins élevé, une fois opérés les ajustements de prix relatifs aux taxes implicites. De manière générale, cependant, les variations de prix sont conformes au modèle concurrentiel, ce qui corrobore cet axiome économique selon lequel le choix des agents à qui doit être attribué le rôle de contribuable est davantage une question de forme que de substance économique.     

The Death Care Industry: A Review of Regulatory and Consumer Issues

Although virtually every person in the United States will purchase or consume a funeral‐related product or service, relatively little is understood about the processes a consumer undertakes in making these expensive decisions in stressful circumstances. Regulation of the industry has been contentious from the outset, and there have been numerous questions as to regulatory effectiveness. This article outlines and discusses issues related to the death care industry with particular attention to consumer interests.     

The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis

This article compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. For our sample of 51 HLTs completed between 1983 and 1989, the valuations of discounted cash flow forecasts are within 10 percent, on average, of the market values of the completed transactions. Our valuations perform at least as well as valuation methods using comparable companies and transactions. We also invert our analysis by estimating the risk premia implied by transaction values and forecast cash flows, and relating those risk premia to firm and industry betas, firm size, and firm book-to-market ratios.     

The Capital Market Response to Wage Negotiations in the Airlines

This paper examines the effect of the announcement of various types of airline wage concessions on stock market value. Our results show that capital markets respond positively to wage cuts but not significantly to wage freezes or two-tier settlements. However, a significant intraindustry spillover effect from two-tier agreements was found that suggests that concessions by one carrier decreases the value of the remaining carriers. The results also vary by craft, indicating that labor market and institutional characteristics influence market response.     

The father role: father-child interaction in work on the farm

This study examines the relationship between the perceived success of farm men in the father role and (i) frequency of work with their children and (ii) perceived conflicts over work. Data were collected by mail survey from 124 men employed in farm work. This study concludes that fathers who think themselves successful in the father role are likely to have less conflict with their children about work. The age, education and income of the father do not contribute significantly to father-child conflict about work.