Estimating the Tax Advantage of Corporate Debt

This paper presents estimates of the effective tax value of incremental interest deductions for corporations taking into account that they may not be able to utilize all their interest deductions fully because of either insufficient taxable income or the availability of nondebt tax shields. After describing particular features of the tax code which may drive a wedge between statutory and effective tax rates for debt finance, we present estimates using the Treasury Corporate Tax Model of effective tax rates for a variety of industry groupings. Our estimates suggest that the after-tax cost of debt varies widely across industries.     

The Capital Market Response to Wage Negotiations in the Airlines

This paper examines the effect of the announcement of various types of airline wage concessions on stock market value. Our results show that capital markets respond positively to wage cuts but not significantly to wage freezes or two-tier settlements. However, a significant intraindustry spillover effect from two-tier agreements was found that suggests that concessions by one carrier decreases the value of the remaining carriers. The results also vary by craft, indicating that labor market and institutional characteristics influence market response.     

The Death Care Industry: A Review of Regulatory and Consumer Issues

Although virtually every person in the United States will purchase or consume a funeral‐related product or service, relatively little is understood about the processes a consumer undertakes in making these expensive decisions in stressful circumstances. Regulation of the industry has been contentious from the outset, and there have been numerous questions as to regulatory effectiveness. This article outlines and discusses issues related to the death care industry with particular attention to consumer interests.     

THE CURSE OF DEMOCRACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM IN COLLAPSED COMMUNIST ECONOMIES

I will begin with some general remarks on democracy. Then, I will discuss democracy as an instrument of reform in a collapsed communist economy.     

Measuring and Motivating Quantity, Creativity, or Both

We examine how worker productivity differs when compensation is based on quantity, creativity, or the product of both measures. In an experiment in which participants design “rebus puzzles,” we find that combining quantity and creativity measures in a creativity‐weighted pay scheme results in creativity‐weighted productivity scores that are significantly lower than those generated by participants with quantity incentives alone. Follow‐up analysis indicates that relative to participants in the quantity‐only condition, participants in the creativity‐weighted condition produce approximately the same number of high‐creativity puzzles, but produce significantly fewer puzzles overall. Thus, while participants rewarded for creativity‐weighted output tend to restrict their production to high‐creativity efforts, they are unable to translate this focus into a greater volume of high‐creativity output. Implications address a possible explanation for firms' reluctance to incorporate creativity measures within multidimensional performance measurement systems, notwithstanding published suggestions to do so.     

Tax Planning and the Exercise of Employee Stock Options*

This paper analyzes tax planning by holders of employee stock options and examines their response to a proposed tax rate increase. Consistent with tax planning, the frequency of exercise is greater for employees affected by the tax change than for (1) employees unlikely to be affected by the tax increase who contemporaneously held identical options, and (2) employees with comparable incomes who held similar options in other years. Despite the greater frequency of exercise, less than one-third of the option holders who would benefit most from exercise for tax reasons chose to exercise early.     

Experimental Evidence of Market Reactions to New Consumption Taxes*

Abstract. Consumption taxes of various forms are of increasing importance worldwide. This study employs a laboratory market design to investigate differential market reactions to three consumption tax forms while holding all other factors constant. Ten laboratory markets were conducted, each involving nine volunteer participants. Market participants were randomly assigned to roles analogous to wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of a market good. The three tax forms were (1) a sales tax imposed on retail consumers of a commodity, (2) a gross-receipts tax imposed on retail sellers, and (3) a value-added tax imposed on sellers at two levels of production. At least three markets were conducted under each tax regime as a basis for experimental comparison. The tax rates used in each structure were chosen so that a competitive model would predict different equilibrium prices but the same tax burdens (the sum of explicit and implicit taxes) across the three tax regimes. Results generally support these predictions, with somewhat stronger support for equivalent tax revenues (explicit taxes collected) than for equivalent tax incidence (distribution of tax burdens after price adjustments). Observed tax incidence differences suggest that market agents who are called upon to explicitly pay taxes actually bear relatively lower tax burdens after implicit tax price adjustments. In general, however, price shifting is consistent with the competitive model, supporting the economic dictum that the choice among alternative designations of taxpaying agents is more a question of form than of economic substance. Résumé. Les taxes à la consommation revêtant diverses formes augmentent en importance à travers le monde. Les auteurs ont conçu un modèle de marché expérimental dans le but d'étudier les différentes réactions du marché à trois formes de taxe à la consommation, tout en maintenant constants l'ensemble des autres facteurs. Dix marchés expérimentaux ont été créés, chacun d'eux faisant intervenir neuf participants volontaires à qui étaient attribués aléatoirement des rôles analogues à ceux de grossistes, de détaillants ou de consommateurs d'un marché de produits. Les trois formes de taxe étaient les suivantes: (1) une taxe de vente s'appliquant aux consommateurs d'un bien sur le marché de détail, (2) une taxe sur les encaissements bruts s'appliquant aux détaillants et (3) une taxe sur la valeur ajoutée s'appliquant aux vendeurs, à deux échelons de production. Au moins trois marchés sous chaque régime fiscal ont servi de base de comparaison expérimentale. Les taux utilisés dans chaque structure ont été choisis de telle sorte qu'un modèle concurrentiel arrive à des prix d'équilibre différents mais à une fardeau fiscal identique (la somme des taxes explicites et implicites) sous les trois régimes. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus confirment ces prédictions, plus encore dans le cas des recettes fiscales équivalentes. Les différentes incidences fiscales observées donnent à penser que les agents du marché de qui l'on réclame explicitement des taxes supportent, en réalité, un fardeau fiscal relativement moins élevé, une fois opérés les ajustements de prix relatifs aux taxes implicites. De manière générale, cependant, les variations de prix sont conformes au modèle concurrentiel, ce qui corrobore cet axiome économique selon lequel le choix des agents à qui doit être attribué le rôle de contribuable est davantage une question de forme que de substance économique.