IES 4 — Ethics Education Revisited

In 2003, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) issued a set of International Education Standards (IES). IES 4 Professional Values, Ethics and Attitudes aims to equip candidates for membership of an IFAC member body with the appropriate professional values, ethics and attitudes to function as professional accountants. This paper explores the implications of IES 4 and analyses some of the challenges arising from an international professional accounting body prescribing ethics education. It concludes with an overview of considerations to be addressed to ensure that the implementation of IES 4 is successful .     

The New Zealand Fair Trading Act of 1986: Deceptive Advertising

In 1986, New Zealand introduced the Fair Trading Act, legislation aimed at consumer protection. This act was modeled after similar Australian legislation, while taking into account the legislation and precedents of other countries including the United States, England, and Canada. Although wording of different nations' legislation is often similar, unique national conditions may give rise to different interpretations. The emergence of the Act may indicate a movement toward minimal international standards in consumer protection legislation among common law countries and to a lesser extent, a large number of Western nations. This paper examines the content and performance of the Act concerning deceptive advertising. Available evidence suggests that the frequency and severity of deceptive advertising has declined. Knowledge of the New Zealand experience provides insight into the evolution of consumer protection legislation and insight for American firms planning commerce there.     

Intraday Patterns in the Cross‐section of Stock Returns

Motivated by the literature on investment flows and optimal trading, we examine intraday predictability in the cross‐section of stock returns. We find a striking pattern of return continuation at half‐hour intervals that are exact multiples of a trading day, and this effect lasts for at least 40 trading days. Volume, order imbalance, volatility, and bid‐ask spreads exhibit similar patterns, but do not explain the return patterns. We also show that short‐term return reversal is driven by temporary liquidity imbalances lasting less than an hour and bid‐ask bounce. Timing trades can reduce execution costs by the equivalent of the effective spread.     

“Time for a Change”: Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks

This paper studies loan conditions when firms switch banks. Recent theoretical work on bank–firm relationships motivates our matching models. The dynamic cycle of the loan rate that we uncover is as follows: a loan granted by a new (outside) bank carries a loan rate that is significantly lower than the rates on comparable new loans from the firm's current (inside) banks. The new bank initially decreases the loan rate further but eventually ratchets it up sharply. Other loan conditions follow a similar economically relevant pattern. This bank strategy is consistent with the existence of hold‐up costs in bank–firm relationships.     

Acquisition Targets and Motives in the Banking Industry

This paper uses a large sample of individual banking organizations, observed from 1996 to 2005, to investigate the characteristics that made them more likely to be acquired. We use a definition of acquisition that we consider preferable to that used in much of the previous literature, and we employ a competing-risk hazard model that reveals important differences that depend on the type of acquirer. Since interstate acquisitions became more numerous during this period, we also investigate differences in the determinants of acquisition between in-state and out-of-state acquirers. We also employ a subsample of publicly traded banking organizations to investigate the role of managerial ownership in explaining the likelihood of acquisition. The hypothesis that acquisitions serve to transfer resources from less efficient to more efficient uses receives substantial support from our results, as do a number of other relevant hypotheses.     

Learning to Wait: A Laboratory Investigation

Human subjects decide when to sink a fixed cost C to seize an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion. The optimal policy is to invest when V first crosses a threshold V * = (1 + w *) C , where the wait option premium w * depends on drift, volatility, and expiration hazard parameters. Subjects in the Low w * treatment on average invest at values quite close to optimum. Subjects in the two Medium and the High w * treatments invested at values below optimum, but with the predicted ordering, and values approached the optimum by the last block of 20 periods.