Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, 1978) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist and we characterize the set of all such mechanisms. We also show that it is impossible to find a mechanism satisfying queue efficiency, egalitarian equivalence, and a stronger notion of strategyproofness called weak group strategyproofness. In addition, we show that generically there is no mechanism satisfying both egalitarian equivalence and no-envy.     

Periodic and chaotic programs of optimal intertemporal allocation in an aggregative model with wealth effects

Summary We examine a discrete-time aggregative model of discounted dynamic optimization where the felicity function depends on both consumption and capital stock. The need for studying such models has been stressed in the theory of optimal growth and also in the economics of natural resources. We identify conditions under which the optimal program is monotone. In our framework, the optimal program can exhibit cyclic behavior for all discount factors close to one. We also present an example to show that our model can exhibit optimal behavior which is chaotic in both topological and ergodic senses.We would like to thank V. Bala, J. Benhabib, P. Dasgupta, R. Day, L. W. McKenzie, K. Nishimura, S. Roy, and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Does a free media protect labour rights?

Based on a sample of 47 developing economies considered over the period 1992–2012, we find that a free media reduces the legal protection of labour, taken as a whole. However, the impact differs over various aspects of labour regulation: while media freedom correlates with less stringent regulation of work time, less constraints to dismissal, and lower protection of employee representation rights, it also correlates with greater legal parity of part-time and fixed-term labour with full-time and permanent workers.     

Decomposition of Technological Change and Factor Bias in Indian Power Sector: An Unbalanced Panel Data Approach

Technological change and factor bias in the Indian power sector are analyzed using a translog cost function. Various components of technological progress and factor bias are identified and estimated, using a 21 year unbalanced panel data of Indian states and union territories. Heterogeneity across states is incorporated in the model using a variance component model. Appropriate corrections are made for unbalanced panel data. Empirical results show that the annual average rate of technological progress has been 2.4% for the country as a whole. Accumulation of knowledge and increasing scale are found to be the major factors contributing to technological progress. In contrast, the effects of factor price changes and fixed capital accumulation on technological progress have been unfavorable. Pure factor bias measure indicate saving in the use of fuel and labor, and increased use of materials. Tests are performed to check the curvature properties of the underlying technology.     

The new urban landscape: Developers and edge cities

In this paper we model the decisions of an edge city developer who chooses business district capacity and location strategically to maximize profits. The developer competes against a core city with historically given downtown capacity for employment and, implicitly, residential population. Moving nearer the core city enhances production efficiency by increasing the efficiency of the exchange of information between businesses in the core and edge city. On the other hand, it increases typical residential rents and commuting costs (and hence wages demanded by employees) and weakens the developer's local monopsony power. The developer's choice of location and capacity play out in a complex but fascinating fashion, depending on the historical capacity of the downtown.     

Warranty as a Signal of Quality: The Moderating Effect of Consumer Knowledge on Quality Evaluations

Prior research has shown that consumers use warranties as a signal of quality. This article explores whether prior knowledge moderates consumers' utilization of warranty information in evaluating product quality. In particular, we examine how prior knowledge impacts the relative use of warranty information when consumers are already aware of firm reputation. Indeed, we find that the extent to which warranty information is used in quality evaluations varies with prior knowledge. We report the results of two experiments, which somewhat surprisingly suggest that, for experts, a better warranty leads to perceptions of higher quality, regardless of firm reputation. Novices on the other hand, tend to perceive a better warranty as a signal of higher quality only when the firm is reputable but not when its reputation is low.     

INFORMAL SECTOR, NETWORKS AND INTRA-CITY VARIATIONS IN ACTIVITIES: FINDINGS FROM DELHI SLUMS

Based on a micro-survey of around 800 slum households in Delhi this paper highlights the role of networks in accessing jobs in the urban labor market. Primarily three types of networks have been identified, which operate through kinship bonds, caste and ethnicity bonds, and formal channels like NGOs and employment exchanges. The type of networks used seems to vary across occupations. Based on a multinomial logit model the paper notes that given the differences in the nature of economic activities performed in different parts of the city, factors like networks and the urge to reside near the contact person and the work place make the urban labor market highly segmented. Hence, certain pockets within the city tend to get crowded by the growth of slums, and secondly inter-spatial variations in terms of activities/occupations make slum population in the city a heterogeneous set, and thus their problems and need vary substantially. Hence, any uniform policy for clusters located in different zones may not be able to tackle effectively the problems of slum dwellers in the city.