Arms Races and Negotiations

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will). There is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons. We find conditions under which the unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. However, if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero.     

Rationale and Motivation of Agricultural Producers in Adopting Crop Rotation in the Northern Great Plains,USA

Despite several environmental and economic benefits of crop rotation, the adoption of this agricultural practice is relatively low. Understanding the reasons for low adoption is important from a sustainability policy perspective. This study explores the motivation, challenges, and sources of information of agricultural producers who participate in crop rotation practices in South Dakota, North Dakota, and Nebraska. The findings of a mail survey of 672 producers in these three states show that producers are familiar with the crop rotation practice. Economic profitability is found to drive motivation for crop rotation adoption. The results of a binary logistic regression model show that a producer who perceives that crop rotation is beneficial to farm profitability is 1.83 times more likely to adopt it than the producer who does not believe in its profitability to the farm. The lack of time or resources is the primary barrier to the adoption of crop rotation practice. This study provides additional evidence in support of the importance of farm profitability for the adoption of the practice of crop rotation. Understanding the rationale and addressing the challenges faced by agricultural producers would be useful in planning and policy making of sustainable agriculture.     

So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships

While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship lender's informational advantage over a non-relationship lender may generate a higher probability of selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 42%, while for a non-relationship lender, this probability is 3%. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater information asymmetries are significantly likely to obtain future loans from their relationship lenders. Relationship lenders are likely to be chosen to provide debt/equity underwriting services, but this effect is economically small.     

The Impact of the Health Insurance Market on Small Firm Employment

Small firms that offer health insurance to their employees may face variable premiums if they hire employees with high expected health costs. To avoid expensive premium variability, small firms may attempt to maintain a workforce with low expected health costs. This results in employment distortions. I examine the magnitude of these employment distortions using the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Based on the underwriting behavior of insurance companies in 1988, I classify medical conditions into three categories: conditions that led to denial of coverage; conditions that led to exclusion restrictions; and, conditions that led to higher premiums. In 1987, I find that insured small firms were less likely to employ workers with families that had conditions that led to higher premiums than insured large firms. However, in 1996, possibly due to the passage of small group health insurance reforms that restrict insurers' ability to exclude or deny coverage, insured small firms were less likely to employ workers with denial conditions compared to insured large firms. These results suggest that the pattern of employment distortions in insured small firms is consistent with the evolving small group health insurance market.     

The Effect of Provision Points on Generic Advertising Funding

Marketing Letters - Generic advertising promotes the general qualities of a product category and, therefore, benefits all firms in the category. Recent examples of such campaigns organized through...     

Incentive Complementarity in China’s Rural Enterprises

Complementarity between incentive instruments is a central theme of theoretical research in industrial organization. However, despite its importance, empirical evidence on the existence of complementarities is limited. We identify complementarities between incentive mechanisms using a dataset on rural firms in China. Using a panel regression framework, we confirm that significant complementarities exist in terms of the impact of incentive instruments on the performance of firms. In order to evaluate the robustness of our results we account for unobserved differences in firm quality using fixed effects and instrumental variables regressions. Support for the complementarity hypothesis is found after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.     

Bibliometric monitoring of research performance in ICT-based disaster management literature

Quality & Quantity - The increasing diffusion of Information Communication Technologies (ICT) in the domain of disaster management depicts the catalyzed efforts and interests of nations for...     

Towards a model of dynamic capabilities in innovation-based competitive strategy: Insights from project-oriented service firms

With the growing significance of services in most developed economies, there is an increased interest in the role of service innovation in service firm competitive strategy. Despite growing literature on service innovation, it remains fragmented reflecting the need for a model that captures key antecedents driving the service innovation-based competitive advantage process. Building on extant literature and using thirteen in-depth interviews with CEOs of project-oriented service firms, this paper presents a model of innovation-based competitive advantage. The emergent model suggests that entrepreneurial service firms pursuing innovation carefully select and use dynamic capabilities that enable them to achieve greater innovation and sustained competitive advantage. Our findings indicate that firms purposefully use create, extend and modify processes to build and nurture key dynamic capabilities. The paper presents a set of theoretical propositions to guide future research. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. Finally, directions for future research are outlined.     

Common Ground Between Free‐Traders and Environmentalists

We use a North–South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto‐dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to “drag down” its richer trading partner, when they degrade their stocks which would be preserved under autarky. It may enable the environmentally richer country to “pull up” its partner, when they preserve their stocks which would be degraded under autarky.     

The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems

We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded)bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of externalfunds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions thatfavor each system with the historical conditions prevailingwhen these financial systems evolved during the British andGerman industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consideran entry model where financiers take the industrial structureas given when they lend and firms take the financial systemas given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist,compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustnessto coordination between lenders and borrowers.