Making sense of new technology during organisational change

This article examines how employees interpret the use of various social media and web 2.0 technologies by managers of an organisation during a merger process. The article explores the way in which managers use technology to give sense to the merger process, the corresponding sensemaking of employees and also how employees make sense of the use of technology itself. The findings show that new media enables the sharing of emotional sense about organisational processes between managers and employees and places employees with different levels of involvement with the process and at different points in the organisational hierarchy on equal footing. In spite of this, employees view the use of technology negatively and feel mastered by the technology itself. In discussing these unintended consequences of the use of this technology, the article further discusses the paradoxes that emerge from using new technology to give sense during organisational change.     

Competition in banking: A disequilibrium approach

The Rosse–Panzar revenue test for competitive conditions in banking is based on observation of the impact on bank revenue of variation in factor input prices. We identify the implications for the H-statistic of misspecification bias in the revenue equation, arising when adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous. In simulations, fixed effects estimation produces a measured H-statistic that is severely biased towards zero. Empirical results for the banking sectors of the Group of Seven (G7) countries corroborate our principal finding, that a dynamic formulation of the revenue equation is required for accurate identification of the H-statistic.     

Changes in bonus contracts in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley era

We examine whether the relation between earnings and bonuses changes after Sarbanes–Oxley. Theory predicts that, as the financial reporting system reduces the discretion allowed managers, firms will put more weight on earnings in compensation contracts to encourage effort. However, the increased risk imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley on executives may cause firms to temper this contracting outcome. We examine and find support for the joint hypothesis that the implementation of Sarbanes–Oxley and related reforms led to a decrease in earnings management and that firms responded by placing more weight on earnings in bonus contracts. We find no evidence that firms changed compensation contracts to compensate executives for assuming more risk.     

Which Credit Unions are Acquired?

Recent years have witnessed a wave of consolidation amongst US credit unions. Through hazard function estimations, this paper identifies the determinants of acquisition for credit unions during the period 2001-06. The hazard of acquisition is inversely related to both asset size and profitability, and positively related to liquidity. Growth-constrained credit unions are less attractive acquisition targets. Institutions with low capitalization and those with small loans portfolios relative to total assets are susceptible to acquisition. The investigation presents unique empirical evidence of a link between technological capability and the hazard of acquisition. During the period 2001-06, when there was sustained growth in the use of internet technology, credit unions with no website were at the highest risk of acquisition.     

Corporate cash holdings and political connections

We examine the relation between corporate liquidity and political connections measured via lobbying expenditures. This is an interesting question as many of the motives for holding cash should be diminished by political connections. Results indicate a significant and inverse relation between cash levels and lobby expenses and that the marginal value of cash decreases with lobbying. Taken together, these findings suggest firms react optimally to the reduced benefits of cash linked to political connections and that the market recognizes the weakened benefits of cash. Overall, our research shows another way political connections can shape corporate policy.     

The implications of ineffective internal control and SOX 404 reporting for financial analysts

The mandatory reporting of firms’ internal control effectiveness continues to be debated by equity market participants, U.S. regulatory agencies and oversight committees. We investigate the implications of material weaknesses in internal control and SOX 404 required reporting of such for financial analysts because analysts are important intermediaries in the U.S. capital market and it is not known whether analysts’ forecasts or coverage decisions are affected by firms’ internal control problems or reporting, respectively. Results of our empirical tests indicate that analysts provide less accurate forecasts and there is greater forecast dispersion for firms with ineffective internal control. We also find that firms that disclose internal control problems have less analyst coverage and that analyst following declines after the material weakness in internal control is disclosed. The results are robust to controlling for potential self-selection bias and management earnings guidance. Our study documents the consequences of ineffective internal control for an important class of financial statement users and suggests the required reporting on the effectiveness of internal control is beneficial to understanding the properties of analysts’ forecasts.     

Business cycles,financial cycles and capital structure

We perform peridogram based cycle analysis of firm capital structure and find evidence that firms’ leverage is both persistent and cyclical. The cyclicality of leverage is supported by the trade-off, pecking order and market timing capital structure theories (Korajczyk and Levy in J Financ Econ 68:75–109, 2003; Bhamra et al. in Rev Financ Stud 23:645–703, 2010). Although market timing theory research supports persistence, previous literature dictates that the trade-off and pecking order theories may predict either persistent or mean reverting leverage. Our tests reject mean reversion in favor of persistent and cyclical leverage. We corroborate pecking order theory literature that predicts leverage is persistent. In these models, when firms’ investment spending is below earnings, leverage decreases. In addition, we examine whether firms change their capital structure as a result of business and financial cycles. Since financial cycles last longer than business cycles, financial cycles should have a long term effect on leverage. Our findings confirm the persistent leverage business cycle models that suggest firms change their capital structure due to financial and credit cycles (Jermann and Quadrini in Am Econ Rev 102:238–271, 2012; Azariadis et al. in Rev Econ Stud 83:1364–1405, 2016). We conclude that leverage is persistent due to the cyclicality of the financing decision.     

A theoretical framework for the studio as a learning environment

In this article we describe a holistic, ecological framework that takes into account the surface structures and pedagogical approaches in the studio and how these elements are connected to the construction of design knowledge: epistemology. In our development of this framework, we came to understand how disciplinary underpinnings and academic culture shape the ways that studio is enacted. Using practice theory, we illustrate our framework with two examples—one in Industrial Design and another in Human Computer Interaction—that demonstrate the ways in which the studio can act as a bridge between academic and professional communities. We came to see the studio as a unique practice community that connects academic and professional contexts. We argue that successful implementation of studio-based learning involves an awareness of disciplinary canons, ontological approaches to knowledge, and the academic constraints on studio-based approaches to learning.     

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.