Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators

The economic effects of federalism are unclear: some papers find that federalism has strong positive effects on a number of economically relevant variables, others find negative effects. The results often crucially hinge on the proxies for federalism used. In this paper, we critically survey the existing indicators for both federalism and fiscal decentralization. We argue that federalism is a constitutional institution, whereas decentralization is the outcome of a policy choice, and that the two ought to be systematically distinguished because decentralization can also occur in nonfederally structured states. We further argue that institutional details are very important with regard to federalism and that dummy variables usually capture only very specific aspects of these institutional details. We use factor analysis to test whether the latent variables behind the observed indicators support these assumptions. More than two important factors are derived, implying that a more fine-grained differentiation beyond simply “‘federalism” and “decentralization” might be in order. The correlations of the most important proxies for various aspects of federalism and decentralization with a number of quasi-exogenous variables, as well as with institutional variables, are usually rather modest.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Market Instability and Revision Error in Risk Premium

This paper provides a theory and evidence that the risk premium puzzle is viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to the unstable foreign exchange market. In an unstable market, revision error uncompensated by an initial risk premium accrues due to consumer expectation revision about the ex ante uncertainty of the exchange rate. The risk premium widely deviates from its initial level, depending on the frequency of the consumer expectation revision and the degree of risk aversion. Subsequent evidence shows the existence of the revision errors for the risk premium during the Asian currency crisis and the recent financial crisis periods.     

Robust Event Studies for Derogation from Suspension of Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995–2008

This paper examines the possible effect of the derogation from suspension of concentrations by the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) on the stock performance of the requested companies. For this reason, we examined 16 companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (A.S.E) that are involved to 13 requested derogations from suspension during the period 1995–2008 by applying and assessing the results of three different event study methodologies (market model, mean adjusted return model and market adjusted return model). From the empirical findings, we conclude that the argument of the requested companies concerning the subsequent negative effect on their stock performance if the derogation from suspension by the HCC is delayed or not granted does not hold. On the contrary, the average abnormal and cumulative returns of the requested companies are positive and statistical significant. In addition, the results of the three event study methodologies are robust.     

Barcode Empires: Politics,Digital Technology,and Comparative Retail Firm Strategies

Like other service sectors, information technology has dramatically altered the growth and character of the retail trade sector in the affluent economies. Nevertheless, significant variation exists in the typical strategies of retail firms in different countries. This article explores this variation and proposes an explanation for why retailers achieved scale and solved their make, buy, and partner decisions along such different trajectories. It argues that national bases for scale retailing were shaped by a series of political negotiations starting in the 1960s and 1970s. This demonstrates once again that technology implementation is rarely determined by the technology itself, but more often by social and political rules. Future technology platforms, such as web-based or mobile commerce, should be expected to follow similar political logics. As multinational retailing firms spread around the globe, this has important implications for national competition policy.     

Value Capture and Policy Design in a Digital Economy

Pervasive information and communication technology (ICT), intertwined with global dispersion of supply chains, is inducing a sizable structural transformation. All the articles in this special issue highlight that even though technology is the key driver, the reactions of businesses and countries to these transformations will depend on economic, political, and social arrangements within each organization and society. The competitive landscape of the ICT industry itself is likely to remain in flux. Also in other industries, both value creation and value capture are becoming increasingly complex—and remain more favorable for the developed countries than some commonly used measures suggest. According to the prevailing economic thinking, public policies should set market-friendly “rules of the game” and then stay out of the way. In the ICT domain, technical standards, spectrum allocations, and market power associated with various types of lock-ins play crucial roles calling for more active public involvement. In particular, the dynamic aspects of competition and anti-trust policies are important yet complex. While there is limited scope for sectoral or horizontal industrial policies, this special issue provides alternative avenues for considering matrix or systemic policies emphasizing education, openness, and national competitiveness.     

Minimax price bounds in incomplete markets

This paper develops an approach to tighten the bounds on asset prices in an incomplete market by combining no-arbitrage pricing and preference-based pricing, and the approach is applied to a call option in the absence of dynamic rebalancing. With the no-arbitrage pricing, it is straightforward to obtain the initial bounds, which are too wide to be of practical uses. By accepting that a representative agent exhibits risk aversion from a benchmark pricing kernel, it is possible to narrow the bounds considerably. Using the unbiased minimax deviation implicit in the parameters, one can restrict further the set of reasonable values on assets in incomplete markets.     

Managers and Wage Policies

Do individual top managers matter for wages and wage policies? Are there general differences in “style” among managers with respect to worker compensation? To shed light on these questions, we exploit a large panel dataset from Portugal that allows us to match workers, firms, and managers, and follow the movements of the latter across different firms over time. While accounting for the effect of worker and firm heterogeneity, we estimate the role of top manager fixed effects in determining wages and wage policies. The estimates suggest that (i) top managers have a significant influence on wages and wage policies; (ii) there exists different managerial “styles”; and (iii) managers’ (observable) attributes matter for worker compensation.     

Monday returns and asset pricing

The seasonal patterns observed on Monday stock returns are still unexplained by different asset pricing models. We attempt to fill this gap in the finance literature by using the Fama-French (Journal of Financial Economics 33:3–56, 1993) risk factors to explain the Monday seasonal. The results in the study show that Monday returns are explained by risk factors such as the market return, the size of the firms, and the book-to-market ratios of firms.