Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

In weak institutional settings, autocrats barter political and economic concessions for support to remain in power and extract rents. Instead of viewing the favors’ beneficiaries, i.e. the elites, as an exogenous entity, we allow the king to decide whom to coopt provided the subjects are heterogeneous in the potential support—their strength—they could bring to the regime. While the ruler can select the elites on the basis of their personal characteristics, an alternative strategy consists in introducing some uncertainty in the cooptation process. The latter strategy allows the king to reduce the clients’ cooptation price since in the event of a revolution the likelihood of being included in the future body of elites is lower. We show that weak rulers are more likely to coopt the society’s strongest individuals, while powerful rulers diversify the composition of their clientele. Moreover, when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is more likely to randomly coopt subjects.     

Competition for private capital and central grants: the case of Japanese industrial parks

Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our results suggest that a Japanese local government’s choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government’s policy choices. As the value of the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts’ lobby activities and their industrial park values, we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the central government in this unitary state.     

The role of intellectual capital in the success of new ventures

Identifying the factors that contribute to the success of new ventures is a difficult and challenging task. In that respect, this paper proposes an analysis of the intellectual capital within new business ventures. Based on the study of a sample of 130 new companies, for the purpose of this work we have analysed the influence of the proposed intangible assets on the success of newly-created organizations, acknowledging the key role of the human and relational capital in the first few years of the life of the business.     

Allocation of public funds to R&;D: a portfolio choice-styled decision model and a biotechnology case study

A decision problem—allocating public research and development (R&D) funding—is faced by a planner who has ambiguous knowledge of welfare effects of the various research areas. We model this as a reverse portfolio choice problem faced by a Bayesian decision-maker. Two elements of the planner’s inferential system are developed: a conditional distribution of welfare ‘returns’ on an allocation, given stated preferences of citizens for the different areas, and a minimum risk criterion for re-allocating these funds, given the performance of a status quo level of funding. A case study of Canadian public research funds expended on various applications of agricultural biotechnology is provided. The decision-making methodology can accommodate a variety of collective expenditure and resource allocation problems.