新型农村合作医疗制度实施效果:一个供需视角的分析

本文从卫生服务市场的供需双方综合考虑中国新型农村合作医疗制度的实施效果.利用2007年4省7县的调查数据对比分析了参合农民和未参合农民在自评健康和慢性病患病情况及就诊情况的差异,运用计量模型分析了新农合实施前后乡镇卫生院业务收入的变化.研究结果表明,新农合提高了参合农民患慢性病的确诊率和就诊率,并改变了参合农民的就诊流向;但是并没有改善参合农民的总体健康状况;也没有显著提高乡镇卫生院的业务收入.     

我国人口和计划生育工作中存在的问题及对策

我国人口和计划生育工作中存在近期人口惯性增长势头依然强劲，人口素质总体水平不高，人口老龄化日趋严重，出生人口性别比居高不下等问题。对此，应继续稳定和完善现行人口和计划生育政策；建议恢复婚检，加强婚育、保健和教育工作，提高人口素质；逐步建立覆盖城乡居民的养老保障制度；采取有效措施，严惩用B超鉴定性别后有意堕女胎的行为；加强计划外生育的管理，健全城乡基本保障制度，扭转出生人口性别比偏高问题。     

国外隐形冠军研究综述与展望

通过回顾隐形冠军的已有研究,首先阐述了隐形冠军概念的界定标准及拓展;其次,辨析了隐形冠军与德国中小企业、深度利基企业、新兴隐形冠军等概念的联系与区别;之后,梳理了已有的研究发现或主张,并从持续竞争优势、国际化、创新、组织、对比分析等视角进行了归纳;最后,结合现有研究的不足,阐述了隐形冠军未来的研究方向。     

战后日本经济变动的新古典分析

任何一个经济体系在长期内的波动都会受到该经济体系内部与外部因素的影响--日本经济也不例外.在新古典增长理论框架内,利用哈罗德中性C-D生产函数分析日本战后的经济增长,认为劳动、资本以及技术是驱动或制约日本经济的主要内因.然而在不同的经济发展阶段,三种因素的驱动作用不尽相同.     

Technology licensing and collusion

This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing via fixed-fee, royalty or two-part tariff and tacit collusion between firms that produce homogeneous goods under asymmetric cost structures and compete in quantities. In contrast to Lin (1996), all forms of licensing facilitate (obstruct) collusion, if the initial cost difference between the firms is relatively less (more). Technology will always be licensed, and the optimal form of licensing is either fixed-fee or royalty or two-part tariff, but collusion may or may not be possible post-licensing. Welfare decreases after licensing if the firms collude only after licensing but not collude under no-licensing.     

安徽省土地违法现状、成因及防治对策

基于安徽省土地违法现状,分析成因,提出从强化耕地保护意识、优化报批流程及建立共同责任制等多方面加以防治的对策,以期健全土地执法长效监管体系,有效遏制土地违法势头,以保护国土资源,促进并稳定当地房地产市场。     

Multigenerational Mobility Among Males in India

Most studies of intergenerational mobility focus on adjacent generations, and there is limited knowledge about multigenerational mobility—status transmission across three generations. We examine multigenerational educational and occupational mobility in India, using a nationally representative data set the India Human Development Survey that contains information about education and occupation for three generations. We find that mobility has increased over generations for education, but not for occupation. We also find that there are stark differences across social groups, with individuals belonging to socially disadvantaged communities lagging behind in social progress. Multigenerational mobility for Muslims in education and occupation has decreased in comparison to Hindus over the three generations. While we find that there is an increase in educational mobility for other disadvantaged groups such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes compared to General Castes, we do not find evidence of increased occupational mobility over the three generations.     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.