Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Complementarity, growth, and trade

We consider an endogenous growth model with international trade in complementary capital goods. The model possesses several distinct, balanced growth solutions, which we classify using stability under adaptive learning. Some of the equilibria can involve growth rates much higher than others. We show that, in addition to a small (usually positive) effect on a given equilibrium, an expansion in trade may sometimes yield a much larger, sudden jump in growth. The small effect on the initial equilibrium may reduce growth if the opportunity cost of capital rises very fast as growth accelerates. JEL Classification: F12, F15, O41
Complémentarité, croissance, et commerce international. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle de croissance endogène en présence de commerce international de biens capitaux complémentaires. Le modèle possède plusieurs solutions de croissance équilibrée distinctes que les auteurs classifient en utilisant des mesures de stabilité avec apprentissage adaptatif. Certains de ces équilibres peuvent impliquer des taux de croissance plus élevés que d'autres. Il appert qu'une expansion du commerce international, en plus d'avoir un petit effet (habituellement positif) sur un équilibre donné, peut parfois engendrer une augmentation plus forte et soudaine de la croissance. Le petit effet sur l'équilibre initial peut réduire la croissance si le coût d'opportunité du capital augmente rapidement à proportion que la croissance accélère.     

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.