The arms trade game: from laissex-faire to a common defence policy

Multinational arms export control has been the subject of discussionin a variety of fora, from the United Nations through to theWassenaar group of arms producers. It is widely recognised thatfree trade in arms can have negative externalities on nationalsecurity and there are benefits from the international coordinationof controls. However, there has been relatively little economicanalysis of these issues, partly because the market for armsis somewhat unusual. This paper develops a partial equilibriummodel of the international arms market and compares a varietyof possible regimes from laissez-faire at one extreme, to acommon defence policy at the other.     

Information Asymmetries about Measurement Quality

This article studies contracts between a principal and an agent that are robust to information asymmetries about measurement quality. Our main result is that an information asymmetry about measurement quality not only reduces the usefulness of a given performance measure for stewardship purposes, it also qualitatively changes the way the performance measure is used if the information asymmetry is sufficiently large. We also study the manipulability of performance measures, assuming that poor measurement quality creates room for manipulation via selective (cherry‐picked) corrections by the agent. With known imperfect measurement quality, manipulability lowers the cost of providing incentives. Manipulability introduces overstatements only, while imperfect measurement introduces both overstatements and understatements. However, with an information asymmetry about measurement quality, manipulability can increase the cost of providing incentives, since there is now an induced information asymmetry about manipulability.     

Analysts’ sale and distribution of non fundamental information

We examine an analyst’s sale and distribution of information related to short-term price movements but unrelated to underlying firm value. By selling non fundamental information, the analyst increases competition on the signal, but prices become more sensitive to net order flow, creating an offsetting increase in the non fundamental signal’s value. More precise non fundamental information is more widely distributed. In the limit, a perfect non fundamental signal will be publicly disclosed for an arbitrarily small fee, and the analyst earns profits as if he possessed fundamental information. Consistent with empirical findings, analysts’ recommendations can be profitable, even when widely distributed or seemingly inconsistent with detailed forecasts. Analysis based on non fundamental information does not contribute to greater price efficiency but reduces liquidity costs. In a multi-period setting, traders with non fundamental information do not front-run, preferring to transact only in the period in which uninformed demand is executed.     

A Fiscal Stimulus and Jobless Recovery

We analyze the effects of a government‐spending expansion in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Mortensen–Pissarides labor‐market frictions, deep habits in private and public consumption, investment adjustment costs, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, and adjustments in employment at both intensive and extensive margins. The combination of deep habits and CES technology is crucial. The presence of deep habits magnifies the responses of macroeconomic variables to a fiscal stimulus, while an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the range of available estimates allows the model to produce a scenario compatible with the observed jobless recovery.     

Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules

We examine the linear-quadratic approximation of nonlinear dynamic stochastic optimization problems. A discrete-time version of Magill [1977a. A local analysis of N-sector capital accumulation under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 15(2), 211–219] is generalized to models with forward-looking variables paying special attention to second-order conditions. This is the ‘large distortions’ case in the literature. We apply the approach to monetary policy in a DSGE model with external habit in consumption. We then develop a condition for ‘target-implementability’, a concept related to ‘targeting rules’. Finally, we extend the approach to a comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in a two-country model and show that the ‘small distortions’ approximation is inappropriate for this exercise.     

Macroeconomic Policy and Employment Growth in Australia

Abstract
This article, which explores various aspects of macroeconomic policy and employment growth, is prompted by the relative lack of attention given to these issues in the Green and White Papers on unemployment. The problem of hysteresis reinforces the generally recognised need to reduce the excessive volatility of output and employment growth in Australia. International comparisons presented in the article suggest that Australian output and employment growth have been more volatile than those of the three major OECD countries. Reduction in macroeconomic volatility requires more effective short-term demand management than we have had in the recent past, and in turn, means that we must know more about the strength and timing of the effects of major macroeconomic policy instruments on employment growth and unemployment. This article presents employment growth equations for Australia over the period 1979–93 which incorporate domestic macroeconomic policy effects as well as the influences of the international business cycle. We show that monetary and fiscal policy have had a significant impact on the evolution of employment in Australia and, in particular, that tight monetary and fiscal policy contributed substantially to the recession of 1990–92.     

ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS, SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO EXEMPTION

Owing to the World Trade Organization (WTO) exemption that allows governments to subsidize arms exports, the arms trade is one of the few remaining areas of trade where we observe export subsidies. This paper examines the effect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and conversely the effect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and free trade commitments re‐enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the benefits of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash inefficiencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.     

SMEs,Growth, and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence

This paper explores the relationship between the relative size of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, economic growth, and poverty alleviation using a new database on the share of SME labor in the total manufacturing labor force. Using a sample of 45 countries, we find a strong, positive association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth. The data do not, however, confidently support the conclusions that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth. Furthermore, we find no evidence that SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality.     

2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly*

In the modern theory of growth, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an effect of innovation. Innovative firms, it is argued, would have insufficient incentive to innovate should the prospect of monopoly power not be present. This theme of monopoly runs throughout the theory of growth, international trade, and industrial organization. We argue that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a necessary consequence of innovation. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary for, and may hurt more than help, innovation and growth. We argue that, as a practical matter, it is more likely to hurt.