62.
We characterize the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who faces demand demarcated by a high and a low end and who can
access an (online) auction site (by paying an access cost) in addition to using his own store that can be used as a posted
price selling venue. We first solve for the optimal mechanism of a direct revelation game in which there is no venue-restriction
constraint. We find that the direct optimal mechanism must necessarily incorporate a certain kind of pooling. We then show
that even with the venue constraint, the seller can use a two stage indirect mechanism that implements the allocation rule
from the optimal direct mechanism, and uses the venues in an optimal fashion. The first stage of the indirect mechanism is
a posted price at the store. If the object is not sold, we move to stage two, which involves an auction at the auction site.
A feature of this auction is a buy-now option which is essential for implementing the pooling feature of the optimal direct
mechanism. We also show that the buy-now option in the optimal mechanism is of a “temporary” variety, and that a “permanent”
buy-now option, in contrast, cannot implement the optimal mechanism. Auctions with a temporary buy-now option are in widespread
use on eBay.
We thank the Associate Editor, George Deltas, for his insightful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University
of Basel and the SAET conference 2007.
相似文献