Moving from the lab to the field: Exploring scrutiny and duration effects in lab experiments

The most important issue facing experimental economists is the generalizability of lab results. This letter examines more than 1200 doctor/patient consultations, in which scrutiny and duration of treatment were varied. We show that scrutiny has an important but short-lived effect.     

Changes in equal employment enforcement: What enforcement statistics tell us

The Reagan administration has been accused of setting back civil rights enforcement.This article reviews available data on the administration’s enforcement efforts and discusses changes in emphasis, tone, and types of cases pursued.An emphasis on identifiable victims and a movement away from more punitive measures is apparent.Moreover, the large budget cuts and the administration’s antipathy to goals and timetables raise questions concerning the “quality” of enforcement.     

Currency devaluation and the Cooper paradox in the open-economy macro-disequilibrium model

Zusammenfassung Abwertung und das Cooper-Paradox im Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht. - In diesem Aufsatz wird das Cooper-Paradox im Rahmen eines IS-LM-BT-Ungleichgewichtsmodells überprüft. Die Analyse wird dadurch angereichert, da der monet?re “spillover”-Effekt einer Abwertung integriert wird in das Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht, in dem unechter Handel zum Ungleichgewichtspreis stattfinden kann. So k?nnen sich die “spillover”-Effekte in der gesamten Volkswirtschaft über die Marktverflechtung verbreiten. Es wird gezeigt, da\ unabh?ngig von der Marshall-Lerner Bedingung die heimische Volkswirtschaft schrumpfen wird, obwohl die Abwertung die Handelsbilanz verbessert (Cooper-Paradox). Au\erdem wird gezeigt, da\ dann, wenn die Marshall-Lerner-Bedingung erfüllt ist, die Abwertung sowohl zu einer Verschlechterung der Handelsbilanz als auch zu einer Expansion der heimischen Volkswirtschaft führen kann. Dieses Ergebnis widerspricht dem, was Cooper in den Entwicklungl?ndern mit einer Abwertung beobachtet hat.

---

Resumen Devaluación monetaria y la paradoja de Cooper en un modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta. - En este trabajo se estudia la paradoja de Cooper dentro del contexto de un modelo IS-LM-BT de desequilibrio de ?spillover? separable. Se enriquece el análisis mediante la integración del efecto ?spillover? monetario de una devaluación al modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta, en el cual se permite el comercio a precio de desequilibrio; el efecto ?spillover? resultante se propaga a toda la economía atraves de los eslabonamientos entre los mercados. Se demuestra que la economía nacional se contrae, a pesar de que la devaluatión favorece al balance comercial (paradoja de Cooper), independientemente de que se satisfaga o no la condición de Marshall y Lerner. Asimismo, se muestra que si se satisface la condición de Marshall y Lerner la devaluación puede dar lugar tanto a una deteriorización del balance comercial como a una expansión de la economía national. Este resultado contrasta con lo observado por Cooper en países en desarrollo que han devaluado.

---

Résumé Dévaluation et le Cooper-paradoxe dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte. - Dans cet article l’auteur examine le paradoxe de Cooper en cadre d’un modèle IE-LM-BT. L’analyse est enrichie par l’intégration de l’effet monétaire ?spillover? d’une dévaluation dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte dans lequel le commerce faux peut se passer en prix déséquilibre. C’est pourquoi les effets de ?spillover? peuvent propager dans l’économie entière par les relations d’intermarché. Il est démontré qu’indépendant de la condition de Marshall-Lerner l’économie locale se contracte même si la dévaluation améliore la balance commerciale (le paradoxe de Cooper). Il est aussi démontré que si la condition de Marshall-Lerner est satisfaite une dévaluation peut détériorer la balance commerciale et stimuler l’économie locale en même temps. Ce résultat est contraire à l’expérience de Cooper qui a observé les pays en voie de développement qui dévaluaient leurs monnaies.

     

Drivers of Durable Peace: The Role of Justice in Negotiating Civil War Termination

Attaining durable peace after a civil war has become a major challenge, as many negotiated settlements relapse into violence. How can civil war negotiations be conducted and peace agreements formulated so as to contribute to lasting, durable peace? Previous research has focused on the durability of peace agreements, measured as the absence of violence. This study develops an index to measure durable peace for a period of 8 years after the agreement had been reached, and evaluates the new measure using an existing data set. We ask whether impacts on durable peace are similar or different to those found for the durability of agreements. This question suggests a number of hypotheses that are evaluated with 16 cases of peace agreements. Stable agreements are shown to mediate the relationship between equality provisions in peace agreements and durable peace, and to also mediate the relationship between procedural justice and the reconciliation component of durable peace. Interestingly, economic stability is not a dividend of peace agreements.     

Technology transfers and industry closures

There has been a shift of manufacturing industries from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to emerging countries. In a competitive global economy increases in productivity in any country are generally welfare-enhancing. The established industrialized countries can suffer from the collapse of some industries, and from the associated increase in unemployment. We model this process and analyze the interactions between various rigidities that cause it, such as the minimum viable scale of an industry or the number of workers who lack the necessary skills to change jobs. When, under free trade, the technology transfer causes the manufacturing industry to collapse in the home country, it experiences a discrete drop in welfare and the price of the manufactured good rises sharply. Further transfers may reverse these results. The optimal level of protection is the minimum size required to operate. Conditions that make supporting an ailing industry worthwhile can be interpreted in several ways but the conclusion is inescapable: technology transfers fundamentally affect arguments for industry protection at home.