First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets

Is it better to move first, or second—to innovate, or to imitate? We show that if one player's information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior, the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first‐mover advantage. On the other hand, more extreme information superiority can reverse this, leading to a second‐mover advantage. Knowing more surely what is the best choice, the better‐informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less‐informed player wants to delay to learn. Because of this, more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay, and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive. In fact, in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation.     

Are Investors the Bad Guys? Tenure and Neighborhood Stability in Chelsea,Massachusetts

In this article, we examine the role of investors and occupant‐owners in an urban context during the recent housing crisis. We focus on Chelsea, Massachusetts, because it is a dense city, dominated by multifamily housing structures with high rates of foreclosure for which we have particularly good data. We distinguish between occupant‐owners and investors using local data, and we find that many investors are misclassified as occupant‐owners in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. Then, employing a competing risks framework to study ownerships during the period 1998 through mid‐2010, we find that local investors, who tend to invest more in relation to purchase prices and sell more quickly, experienced approximately 1.8 times the mortgage foreclosure risk of occupant‐owners, conditional on financing. Nonlocal investors have no statistically significant difference in foreclosure risk from occupant‐owners. Nonetheless, those owners with subprime purchase mortgages (most of whom are occupant‐owners) faced the highest foreclosure risk when house prices fell.     

Consumer valuation of safety‐labeled free‐range chicken: results of a field experiment in Hanoi

This article presents results of a field experiment designed to assess willingness to pay for safely produced free‐range chicken in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam. Improved safety of chicken production and trading is suggested as an important component of avian influenza control strategy, which aims to address the direct costs of avian influenza as well as the global public health externality. However, consumer demand for safely produced free‐range chicken is unknown. Products that have credible food labeling are not common in traditional markets where the majority of free‐range chicken is purchased. Valuing characteristics of products sold in informal markets is a major challenge that our experiment overcomes. As part of the experiment, we provided several vendors from these markets with safety‐labeled free‐range chicken. Consumer valuation of safety labeling was elicited through having experiment participants, who were representative of potential consumers, select between discount coupons for either safety‐labeled chicken or regular chicken. Results indicate that consumers will pay at least $0.50, or a 10–15% premium, per chicken purchase for safety labeling, which emphasizes safe production, processing, and transport conditions. This premium is smaller than the premium currently paid for traditional chicken varieties that are considered to be tastier. Consumers with more education have higher valuation of safety labeling. Hence, safety labeling for high‐quality free‐range chicken can play a role in controlling livestock disease and improving public health.     

Specialization,diversification, and productivity: a panel data analysis of rice farms in Korea

This article examines the microeconomics of productivity associated with specialization/diversification in production activities, with an application to Korean rice farms. Korean rice farms tend to be very small and highly specialized. Our analysis examines the productivity effects associated with both farm size and farm specialization/diversification in Korean agriculture. Relying on farm‐level panel data, the analysis studies farm productivity in a multi‐input multi‐output context, accounting not only for changes in inputs and technical change in rice production, but also for the role of diversification in the production of other crops in current and previous periods. We find positive but small productivity gains from farm diversification. These gains come mostly from complementarity effects across farm outputs, with minimal effect of scale economies. The positive complementarity effects work against nonconvexity effects, which provide strong productivity incentives for rice farms to specialize.     

Coping with drought with innovative pricing systems: the case of two irrigation water management companies in France

In recent years, France has been facing particularly severe drought periods especially in summer. In a country where agriculture is the largest water user, some irrigation management companies have implemented innovative pricing systems to handle this situation. The objective of this article is to analyze the impact of these new management systems on farmers’ incomes, the revenue of the management companies, and the amount of water used. To do that, we develop a methodology using a stochastic model that simulates the representative farmer's optimal behavior in a context of climatic variability. An empirical application is made with a crop growth model and data collected from the Midi‐Pyrenees region. The results show that using these specific nonlinear pricing systems allow irrigation water managers to reduce the impact of drought on production. Moreover, the type of pricing implemented depends on the characteristics and capabilities of the water company. More particularly, these pricing systems can be used to anticipate agricultural water demand in order to avoid imbalance with water availability.     

The Role of Bank Reputation in “Certifying” Future Performance Implications of Borrowers’ Accounting Numbers

We investigate the role played by the reputation of lead arrangers of syndicated loans in mitigating information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. We hypothesize that syndications by more reputable arrangers are indicative of higher borrower quality at loan inception and more rigorous monitoring during the term of the loan. We investigate whether borrowers with more reputable lead arrangers realize superior performance subsequent to loan origination relative to borrowers with less reputable arrangers. We further examine whether certification by high‐reputation lead banks extends to the quality of borrowers’ reported accounting numbers. Controlling for endogenous matching of borrowers and lead banks, we find that higher bank reputation is associated with higher profitability and credit quality in the three years subsequent to loan initiation. We also show that bank reputation is associated with long‐run sustainability of earnings via higher earnings persistence, and debt contracting value of accounting via a stronger connection between pre‐loan profitability and future credit quality. We further document that the enhanced earnings sustainability associated with higher reputation lead banks reflects both superior fundamentals and accruals more closely linked with future cash flows.     

Have We Underestimated the Likelihood and Severity of Zero Lower Bound Events?

Prior to the financial crisis, most economists probably did not view the zero lower bound (ZLB) as a major problem for central banks. Using a range of structural and statistical models, we find that previous research understated the ZLB threat by ignoring uncertainty about model parameters and latent variables, focusing too much on the Great Moderation experience, and relying on structural models whose dynamics cannot generate sustained ZLB episodes. Our analysis also suggests that the Federal Reserve's asset purchases, while materially improving macroeconomic conditions, did not prevent the ZLB constraint from having first‐order adverse effects on real activity and inflation.     

Cost of Equity and S&P 500 Index Revisions

We examine how the cost of equity changes when firms are added to or removed from the S&P 500 Index during index revisions. Newly added firms experience a significant decline in the cost of equity, while recently removed firms show a significant increase. Liquidity improves for addition firms and declines for removed firms. Addition firms also experience a decline in shadow cost. Changes in cost of equity for included firms are explained by changes in liquidity, shadow cost, and firm size. Finally, included firms with greater investment opportunities benefit more from the reduction in cost of capital.     

A New Method for Identifying the Effects of Foreign Exchange Interventions

Central banks react even to intraday changes in the exchange rate; however, in most cases, intervention data are available only at a daily frequency. This temporal aggregation makes it difficult to identify the effects of interventions on the exchange rate. We apply the Bayesian Markov‐chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach to this endogeneity problem. We use “data augmentation” to obtain intraday intervention amounts and estimate the efficacy of interventions using the augmented data. Applying this new method to Japanese data, we find that an intervention of 1 trillion yen moves the yen/dollar rate by 1.8%, which is more than twice as much as the magnitude reported in previous studies applying ordinary least squares to daily observations. This shows the quantitative importance of the endogeneity problem due to temporal aggregation.     

The Effect of Regulation on Insurance Pricing: The Case of Germany

This article analyzes the impact of policy form regulation on the unit price of insurance and determinants of premium changes using the 1994 deregulation of the German property–liability market as a natural experiment. Our result show that policy form regulation did not increase prices above competitive levels. Factors influencing premium changes are significantly different for the two time periods, pre‐ and post‐deregulation, indicating that regulation affects insurance pricing. Focusing on highly competitive lines after deregulation, we find a significant price decrease, and this decrease is offset by higher prices in the remaining other lines.