出口加工区的技术溢出效应的文献综述

我国从建立第一批出口加工区以来，至令已过去六个年头了。随着经济的发展，最初建立出口加工区以便于管理出口加工贸易的功能逐步转变为如何更好地拉动当地经济发展。本文对上世纪70年代以来国内外经济学在出口加工技术溢出效应地研究进行了总结，并指出研究的一些不足之处，以期为我国开展相应地研究提供借鉴。     

中欧自由贸易区的运行及其对我国的挑战

本文就中欧自由贸易区产生的历史背景、政治背景以及其产生后的运行情况 ,尤其是其对我国经济 ,主要是对目前我国实施的外贸市场多元化战略所形成的负面影响进行了一些探讨。     

What Works in Securities Laws?

We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.     

Managerial value diversion and shareholder wealth

The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporateaffairs may transfer value from shareholders to themselves througha variety of mechanisms, such as self-dealing, insider trading,and taking of corporate opportunities. A common view in thelaw and economics literature is that such value diversion doesnot ultimately produce a reduction in shareholder wealth, sincevalue diversion simply substitutes for alternative forms ofcompensation that would otherwise be paid to managers. We questionthis view within its own analytical framework by studying, ina principal-agent model, the effects of allowing value diversionon managerial compensation and effort. We suggest that the standardlaw and economics view of diversion overlooks a significantcost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation canprovide managers with incentives to enhance shareholder value;replacing such compensation would reduce these incentives. Asa result, even if the consequences of a rule permitting valuediversion can be fully taken into account in setting managerialcompensation, such a rule might still produce a reduction inshareholder wealth - and would not do so only if value diversionwould have some countervailing positive effects (a possibilitywhich our model considers) that are sufficiently significantin size.     

To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy

How is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich? Theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system. We develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures. We find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad-based democracy where politicians are responsive to low-income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich. The main predictions of the theory are consistent with state-level data and micro data from the U.S. as well as cross-country evidence from the Programme for International Student Assessment study.