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In this article, we examine how the level of regulation affects the size distribution of businesses. To the extent that regulation functions as a fixed cost, it should lead to larger firm size. However, regulations may also lead to smaller establishments with firms outsourcing regulated activities or staying small to take advantage of state exemptions for small businesses from regulations. We empirically examine the relationship between the size distribution of establishments and the level of regulation using state- and industry-level panel data from 1992 to 2004. Our results suggest that regulation decreases the proportion of zero employee and 1–4 employee establishments. The proportion of establishments in the 5–9 employee range generally increases with the level of regulation. Thus, regulation appears to operate as a fixed cost causing establishments to be larger. 相似文献
13.
Russell S. Sobel 《Southern economic journal》1997,64(2):468-485
This paper demonstrates that the optimal structure of taxation in a federal system of governments is one in which only lower level governments are allowed to tax, and the higher level of government receives its revenues as contributions from the lower level governments. The central inefficiency created when multiple levels are allowed to tax is a revenue externality between governments that is analogous to a common pool problem. A federal system with multiple levels of taxing authority results in combined tax rates higher than would be optimal, a higher excess burden of taxation, and an inefficiency bias in government spending. 相似文献
14.
Baumol's [Baumol, W.J., 1990. Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive and destructive. Journal of Political Economy 98 (5), 893–921] theory of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship is a significant recent contribution to the economics of entrepreneurship literature. He hypothesizes that entrepreneurial individuals channel their effort in different directions depending on the quality of prevailing economic, political, and legal institutions. This institutional structure determines the relative reward to investing entrepreneurial energies into productive market activities versus unproductive political and legal activities (e.g., lobbying and lawsuits). Good institutions channel effort into productive entrepreneurship, sustaining higher rates of economic growth. I test and confirm Baumol's theory, and discuss its significance to the literature, economic prosperity, and policy reform. 相似文献
15.
Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Universally Divine outcome. 相似文献
16.
While entrepreneurs benefit from unrestricted free entry into markets, they have a time-inconsistent incentive to lobby for
government entry restrictions once they become successful. Bad political institutions yield to these demands, and growing
barriers are placed on domestic and international competition. Good institutions do not, and this effort is instead channeled
toward further wealth creation. We find that productive entrepreneurship depends on both the freedom to succeed and discipline
of failure that free markets provide. Trade barriers result in fewer combinations of goods and inputs attempted, and less
productive entrepreneurial resource use. We also provide evidence on the value of business failure.
相似文献
Russell S. SobelEmail: |
17.
A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Joel Sobel 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》1999,8(1):33-60
This paper shows that yardstick competition does not assist a regulator when lump-sum transfers are not costly and the regulator does not care about the distribution of income. Yardstick competition may discourage investment that would make efficient operation possible. The paper characterizes optimal regulatory schemes in a simple model and demonstrates that it may be optimal to limit the amount of information available to the regulator. 相似文献
18.
The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Russell S. Sobel 《Constitutional Political Economy》1994,5(2):173-192
This paper uses the principles of constitutional economics to analyze the evolution of two international constitutions, the
League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. A graphical model is used to illustrate the formation and success
of the international organizations created by these documents. This paper concludes that there were two factors that resulted
in the failure of the League. They were the redistribution of power in favor of the smaller nations and the free-rider problem
caused by the non-binding nature of the League's decisions. Amendments were proposed to the League's Covenant which may have
fixed these problems, but they were never ratified. The reasons for the failure of the League had a strong influence on the
wording of the U.N. Charter. The analysis in this paper is an extension of the tools provided by constitutional economics,
which have mostly been applied to national constitutions.
The author would like to thank Bruce L. Benson, Charles J. Barrilleaux, Stefan C. Norrbin, three anonymous referees of this
journal, and especially Randall G. Holcombe for helpful comments and suggestions. Any shortcomings remain the responsibility
of the author. 相似文献
19.
Russell S. Sobel 《Constitutional Political Economy》1996,7(4):309-316
In his book, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, Frank Vibert explores every major issue that will arise in the design of a constitution for a European political union. Can the theoretical constructs of constitutional economics be used to aid in the practical design of a European constitution? This is what Vibert attempts to do in his book. This review contains a more detailed discussion and analysis of a few of Vibert's main theses. In particular, it focuses, on several key issues that will be the major determinants of whether the European Union will achieve lasting success. 相似文献
20.
In the economic development literature, cultural diversity (for example, ethnolinguistic fractionalization) has been shown
to have a negative impact on economic outcomes in many underdeveloped countries. We hypothesize that the impact of diversity
on economic performance depends on the quality of a country's institutions. Under bad institutions diversity leads to conflict
and expropriation, while under good institutions diversity leads to economic progress. A culturally diverse society or interaction
among different cultures encourages exchange of, and competition between ideas and different world views. Under good institutions,
this amalgamation of ideas and views leads to greater entrepreneurial initiatives. We show that higher levels of cultural
diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship in the presence of good institutions using evidence from the USA. 相似文献