Strategic schemas,strategic flexibility,and firm performance: the moderating role of industry clockspeed

We examine the moderating effect of industry clockspeed on the relationship between strategic schemas, strategic flexibility and firm performance. We employ two key properties of strategic schemas: complexity and focus. Using a sample of 225 firms from 14 industries, we show that the pattern of relationships among the theoretical constructs is different in fast‐ and slow‐clockspeed industries. The results suggest that complexity of strategic schemas promotes strategic flexibility and success in fast clockspeed industries, whereas focus of strategic schemas fosters strategic persistence, which is effective in slow‐clockspeed industries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Payment For Risk: Constant Beta Vs. Dual-Beta Models

Fama and French's (1992) assertion that investors receive premium payments for risk associated with the book value to market price (BE/ME) and size and not for holding beta risk has sparked a lively debate concerning risk factors that are priced in the market. Howton and Peterson (1998) use a dual-beta model to test the Fama and French conclusions. They conclude that the significant relationship between beta and returns depends on the use of the dual-beta model. This work, however, ignores the results reported by Pettengill, Sundaram, and Mathur (PSM, 1995). PSM find a significant relation between a constant risk beta and returns when data are segmented between up and down markets, but do not consider the impact of size and BE/ME. In this paper we show that the PSM (1995) market segmentation procedure alone provides a sufficient condition to identify a significant relation between beta and returns in the presence of size and BE/ME. Dual market betas may be relevant in explaining risk and return. However, the market segmentation procedure of PSM (1995) is the critical condition for finding a significant relationship between returns and betas.     

BOND REFUNDING IN EFFICIENT MARKETS: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS WITH TAX EFFECTS

This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the bond refunding problem in an efficient market setting with corporate taxes and transaction costs. A new methodology is developed to analyze the optimal exercise problem in the presence of imperfections. This analysis enables prediction of the effect of changes in corporate tax laws on the refunding decision. It also explains the empirical observation that bonds are often called when the bond price is below the call price.     

Participating convertible preferred stock in venture capital exits

This paper develops a theory of the participating convertible preferred (PCP) stock commonly used in venture capital settings. I show that the participation and convertibility features of PCP stock can be used to reduce information asymmetry between the venture and potential investors at the time of exit. Further, the convertibility feature of PCP helps in alleviating the problem of insufficient entrepreneurial effort. I then derive implications for the two most common types of exits in venture capital—initial public offerings and trade sales—and explain how US venture capital markets differ from other VC markets.     

The Young and the Restless: A Study of Age and Acquisition Propensity of CEOs of UK Firms

Using a large sample of CEOs of UK firms, we show that CEO age is a key determinant of acquisition activity. We find that younger CEOs are more likely to acquire another firm and spend more on large capital expenditures. We argue that while younger CEOs of both UK and US firms undertake more acquisitions than their older peers, their motivations for acquisitions might differ. We find that the stock market perceives acquisitions by younger CEOs to be of a higher quality. Following previous studies, we use CEO tenure as a proxy for reputation, and find that large acquisitions enhance CEO reputation, especially for younger CEOs. In contrast to the previous findings for CEOs of US firms, we determine that the compensation of CEOs in the UK does not increase after acquisitions. This absence of a compensation incentive for CEOs of UK firms is consistent with the idea that the UK compensation structure is more restrictive and has a smaller equity‐based component. Our evidence is also inconsistent with an overconfidence effect. Overall, our results provide consistent evidence of executive signaling by younger CEOs of UK firms eager to distinguish themselves.     

Correction to: The impact of a U.S.–U.K. free trade agreement on workers: a CGE model with worker displacement

Business Economics -     

Perverse liquidity effect of monetary policy: some evidence for India

The liquidity effect of money supply increases, as policy-oriented measures, would generally lead to a decline in interest rates. This is the direct effect. However, such money supply increases lead to a sum of the direct effect plus the positive indirect price and income effects. In sum, the net effect may be positive leading to a net increase and not a decrease in the interest rate. The regular money demand function is suitably modified to capture the structural changes of the Indian economy to verify the net effect of monetary policy-induced money supply movements. The empirical evidence indicates the presence of a perverse liquidity effect.     

The boundary spanning capabilities of purchasing agents in buyer-supplier trust development

This study examines how individual purchasing agents function as boundary spanners with suppliers to influence trust development in themselves and the buying firms that employ them. Building upon boundary theory and supply chain cooperation research, we identify three boundary spanning capabilities of purchasing agents and empirically test how these capabilities shape buyer-supplier trust development. Using two samples of data collected from suppliers in the automotive industry and food industry, we found that a purchasing agent's effectiveness in strategic communication with suppliers affects a supplier's trust in the buying firm, while an agent's professional knowledge and ability toreach compromises with suppliers affect a supplier's trust in the purchasing agent representing the firm. Trust in the purchasing agent in turn affects trust in the buying firm. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

Price‐matching guarantees

Are price‐matching guarantees anticompetitive? We examine the incentives for price‐matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly. The conventional explanation of price matching as facilitating cartel pricing finds some theoretical support, but our model provides an additional explanation. A price‐matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed consumers that a firm is low priced. The credibility of the signal is assured by the behavior of informed consumers. We contrast the testable implications of our model with those arising from two theories of price matching as anticompetitive, and show that available evidence supports the signalling theory.