Sales recruiting—A major area of underinvestment

How does a firm decide whether the amount now being spent to generate sales force applicants is too much, not enough, or about right? This question can be answered by using information routinely generated by corporate activities and a relatively straight forward decision theory technique. To illustrate that technique, an analysis was conducted for a hypothetical but by no means atypical firm. The results suggest that many corporations could appreciably increase their overall profitability by spending more on sales force recruitment and selection.     

Developing countries' strategic opportunities

The rapid transition from the industrial age to the knowledge age may require developing nations to reassess their strategies toward the attraction of foreign investment. Highly focused technology villages based on the creation of industry-specific technology infrastructures blended with educated and trained nationals may be the best alternative for benefiting from the global economic changes. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement

This paper examines the optimal fine for violations of environmental regulations, taking into account financial constraints facing regulated firms and the hierarchical structure of regulatory enforcement. Contrary to the existing literature, which suggests that maximal fines are sub-optimal, we find that the optimal fine is either the maximum amount the firm can afford to pay or zero (i.e., no regulation). The impact of a change in industry structure on the optimal fine, firm compliance and regulatory resource strategies is considered. We identify conditions under which the equilibrium level of regulatory resources decreases with an increase in the number of firms in the industry.