减少汽车业的浪费

汽车制造商和零件供应商可以节省巨大开支，但前提是双方要更为紧密地合作在一起麦肯锡的研究表明，北美汽车业每年在产品开发和组装过程中由于汽车生产商与供应商缺乏良好的计划和协调不当，造成了超过100亿美元的浪费。事实上．这只是较为保守的估算。因为我们的研究仅涵盖了供应商发生的成本，如：附加设计、生产工具最后改型和零件自身的附加成本。这还不包括因设计问题生产商需额外支付的改型费用、生产问题引发的车辆最终成本的增加或质保支出。这几项每年给汽车行业带来的浪费约为120亿美元。     

Industry evolution and R&D externalities

R&D externalities can imply ranges of aggregate increasing returns to scale in R&D. As a consequence several equilibria can exist involving different numbers of firms and different R&D investment levels. In a theoretical model the equilibrium dynamics are analyzed, showing that cyclical fluctuations of the number of firms and R&D investment may be expected, and that the long-run equilibrium is highly sensitive to investors' initial beliefs. The model is tested empirically using a unique database comprising competing firms in various R&D races.     

Stakeholder management in sustainable supply chains: A case study of the bioenergy industry

Engaging with stakeholders and managing their issues when striving for a sustainable supply chain (SC) is a significant challenge. Although most studies on sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) consider stakeholder management necessary, little is known about related stakeholder management practices in SSCM. Thus, this paper seeks to enrich the theoretical debate on stakeholder management practices in SSCM through a case study approach to bioenergy SCs in Chile. Based on 28 interviews with SC actors and representatives from the surrounding stakeholder environment, the deductive–inductive analysis reveals that stakeholder management combines different practices to discuss stakeholder concerns, address them, and evaluate the process at the SC's external and internal levels. We propose structuring these practices based on two dimensions: “practices to address stakeholder requirements” and “practices whereby stakeholders are integrated.” The analysis' results indicate that although two-way communication with stakeholders can be seen as the core of stakeholder management, a certain willingness to learn and transform SC design is a prerequisite for true orientation toward stakeholder management in SSCM. Additionally, linkage development and local anchoring are practices used to obtain further legitimacy at the external level. Building on these findings, this study can guide practitioners in engaging with stakeholders and managing their issues across the SC.     

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001     

The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework

Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.     

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, C71.     

Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs

This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.     

Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play

This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games.