Managing seller-buyer new product development relationships for customized products: a contingency model based on transaction cost analysis and empirical test

Sellers often customize their product offerings in order to increase the value offered to individual buyers and gain a competitive advantage over the seller’s competitors. However, such customization has a downside—it usually requires considerable seller-buyer interactions aimed at matching the seller’s technological capabilities with the buyer’s needs, which can pose exchange risks such as the safeguarding and adaptation problems noted in the transaction cost analysis literature. In the present study, we develop a contingency model to investigate the impact of product customization on sellers’ perceived relationship satisfaction and subsequent expectations of relationship continuity. We draw on the logic of transaction cost analysis to hypothesize that product customization’s effect on satisfaction and continuity may be moderated by three activities that sellers may engage in during the new product development (NPD) process: education, product knowledge generation, and joint new product development.Our substantive hypotheses were tested with data from a national survey of 296 small to medium size firms in several high-tech industries using a series of hierarchical OLS regression models. Overall, we found mixed support for our hypotheses. The results indicated that joint new product development reduced the negative effect of product customization on seller satisfaction and enhanced customization’s positive effect on continuity, as expected. Contrary to our expectations, product knowledge generation activities increased the negative effect of customization on satisfaction; it also had no significant moderating impact on continuity. Buyer education activities were found to reduce the negative impact of customization on satisfaction, but showed no moderating effect on continuity.This study offers important theoretical and managerial implications. It is one of the first to rely on transaction cost analysis as a basis for examining how various relationship activities conducted during the new product development process moderate product customization’s effect on qualitative outcomes. Whereas traditional NPD processes have emphasized unilateral approaches to product development, our study provides evidence of how bilateral approaches to NPD can benefit sellers of innovations. We provide new insights for managers to consider when deciding whether to engage buyers early on and then continue interacting with them throughout the product development process when developing customized products.     

News from the Monopoly Front: Changes in Industrial Concentration, 1992–1997

Comparing concentration ratios between 1992 and 1997 raises difficulties because the 1997 data are arranged according to a new industrial nomenclature. By comparing concentration ratios in industries where the definition did not change, it is possible to make comparisons of changes in concentration between the two years and to document the considerable changes in industrial structure in the manufacturing and retail sectors.     

Can a Shorter Workweek Induce Higher Employment? Mandatory Reductions in the Workweek and Employment Subsidies

This paper presents a unified model of the impact on employment of a mandatory reduction in work hours in combination with an employment subsidy to reduce quasi-fixed costs of employment, while attempting to maintain worker's take-home pay or welfare level. Achieving the dual policy objectives of enhancing employment and maintaining worker income is not necessarily feasible. Nevertheless, a reduction in the legal workweek may induce a degree of downward wage flexibility, while an employment subsidy to firms accommodates downward wage rigidity. It may be possible, therefore, to increase employment with a policy that combines a reduction in the workweek with an employment subsidy. In general, however, the long run employment outcome is ambiguous, and a decline in output cannot be ruled out. More direct policy measures whose impact can be assessed with greater certainty—in particular, removing structural rigidities in the labor market—should be given priority to decrease long term unemployment.     

Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage

We consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a Bertrand-competitive differentiated products downstream industry to: (1) vertically integrate forward, and (2) raise its downstream rivals' costs through non-price activities which we characterize generally as 'sabotage'. We examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price. We find that, while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint, the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation. Welfare effects are also explored.     

The Costs and Benefits of Long-Distance Entry: Regulation and Non-Price Discrimination

A primary goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act isto encourage competition in long-distance telephonemarkets. Four years after passage of thislegislation, Bell Operating Companies (``BOCs') havebeen granted permission to offer long-distanceservices in only one state. The regulatory barrier toentry is justified on grounds that the BOCs have theability to discriminate against incumbentlong-distance carriers in the provision of essentialaccess services. We take this premise as given andquantify the critical level of discrimination requiredto offset the positive consumers' surplus gainsassociated with the enhanced competition resultingfrom BOC entry into long-distance markets.