Buying reputation as a signal of quality: Evidence from an online marketplace

Seller reputation, generated by buyer feedback, is critical to fostering trust in online marketplaces. Marketplaces or sellers may choose to compensate buyers for providing feedback. Signaling theory predicts that only sellers of high-quality products will reward buyers for truthful feedback, especially when a product lacks any feedback and when the seller is not established. We confirm these hypotheses using Taobao's reward-for-feedback mechanism. High-quality products, especially without established feedback, are chosen for feedback rewards, which cause sales to increase by 36%. Marketplaces and consumers can therefore benefit from allowing sellers to buy feedback and signal their high-quality products in the process.     

The globalization of the rule of law and human rights

The third millenium will be a defining period for the future of human rights worldwide. In the second millenium, rudimentary concepts of human rights emerged, evolved, expanded and ultimately were woven into an intricate and detailed web of rights that has been globally enunciated, but not yet universally recognized and enforced. Since World War II, developments have occurred at an escalating pace. The UN and the World Court have been established. Criminal tribunals have been created, and regional courts and regional security organizations have been installed. There is growing recognition that rulers of nations must be subject to civil and criminal jurisdiction of international law. At the close of the second millenium we are witnessing the first ever indictment of a sitting ruler for violations of international criminal law. Despite important progress, many obstacles must be overcome before the rule of law will prevail globally.     

Asymptotic analysis for optimal investment and consumption with transaction costs

We consider an agent who invests in a stock and a money market and consumes in order to maximize the utility of consumption over an infinite planning horizon in the presence of a proportional transaction cost . The utility function is of the form U(c) = c^1-p/(1-p) for p > 0, . We provide a heuristic and a rigorous derivation of the asymptotic expansion of the value function in powers of , and we also obtain asymptotic results on the boundary of the no-trade region.Received: July 2003, Mathematics Subject Classification (1991): 90A09, 60H30, 60G44JEL Classification: G13Work supported by the National Science Foundation under grants DMS-0103814 and DMS-0139911.     

Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.     

A quantitative approach to stakeholder interests

In an age when the role, behaviour and performance of the firm are under greater scrutiny than ever before, it is important to pursue quantitative empirical research in the area of social auditing. Using data relating to one particular company, the various inputs and outputs attributable to the firm's different stakeholders, (shareholders, employees, consumers and the community) are examined and corresponding rates of return calculated. Considerable methodological and data problems arise and consequently the results need careful interpretation.     

Revenue Sharing with Heterogeneous Investments in Sports Leagues: Share Media,Not Stadiums

This study examines revenue sharing in sports leagues where franchises engage in multiple types of investments. Previous literature typically treats revenues and investments as homogeneous, but we add to the literature by differentiating between investment types and revenue sources. This is important because investment in talent leads to winning, which is a zero-sum game for the league and therefore owners have an incentive to limit talent investment. However, other investments, such as stadiums, are not a zero-sum game, and therefore the implications of revenue sharing are different for the league. We provide sufficient conditions under which it is more efficient to share media revenue compared to stadium revenue. We conclude by providing applications of this model.