Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

Why Are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.     

The contribution of macroprudential policies to banks' resilience: Lessons from the systemic crises and the COVID-19 pandemic shock

This study examines the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in reducing the banks' risk during the COVID-19 pandemic and compares these results with the systemic banking crises years. Based on a sample of 624 banks across 40 countries during the period 2006–2020, we find that loosening capital-aimed macroprudential policies effectively reduced banks' risk during the COVID-19 pandemic, while this behavior led to increased risk during the systemic crises years. In contrast, tightening the remaining macroprudential policies during the systemic crises years and during the pandemic proved effective in reducing banks' risk. Furthermore, we show that the magnitude of the impact of macroprudential policies was stronger during the systemic crisis than that during the pandemic. Finally, we show that the results are driven by the capital requirement prudential policy, both during the systemic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, although the conservation buffer and the leverage limit also contributes to the ineffectiveness of these policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. The banks' leverage and loan growth also play an enhancing role of the effects of the macroprudential policies.     

Carryover effects of advertising on sales of durable goods

In a landmark paper, Clarke [Clarke, D.G., J. Marketing Res. 13 (November 1976): 345–357] addressed the question of how long the carryover effect of advertising on sales persists. Appropriate cautions are included in the conclusions reached by Clarke since the preponderance of studies that he reviewed involved mature frequently purchased low-priced products. His conclusion is that, for such products, the carryover effect of advertising lasts a matter of months rather than years. The current study examines durable goods and provides preliminary evidence that for some durables, advertising effects may have a duration interval that exceeds a year.