A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Dependent Development: the Subcontracting Networks In the Tiger Economies

The ‘dependency development’ approach attributes the phenomenal economic growth of Hong Kong and Taiwan to their structural linkage with the advanced industrialised countries through trade. Foreign buyers and sourcing agents of the multinationals subcontract to the Hong Kong and Taiwanese manufacturers for low-cost and flexible production of labour-intensive consumer products. Such a dependency relationship is, however, successfully managed by the manufacturers in the two economies of the operation of a very similar subcontracting system in major industries. This paper examines the nature of the subcontracting system, the reasons for subcontracting, the operating dynamics, the sustaining mechanisms and the inherent structural problems of the subcontracting network. With the industrial restructuring process taking place in Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are changes to the subcontracting system which have significant implications for the welfare of the workers.