A non-parametric approach to smoothing by aggregation over preferences

A distributional dispersion condition on C² monotone preferences, defined by unit normals to indifference surfaces, yields a C⁰ mean demand function when one integrates over such suitably diffuse consumers with convex preferences, regardless of the distribution of their initial endowments. For non-convex preferences, the dispersion condition implies that at any price vector, individual demands are finite sets for almost every agent. A stronger dispersion condition, involving both utility functions and unit normals, yields C⁰ mean demand functions with monotone non-convex preferences.     

Land use and commodity production

An agricultural land use system á la Von Thünen is adduced. Sraffa's theory of production, prices, and distribution is situated within this system. The specific inter-relations of the Von Thünen model and the Sraffa model are then discussed. The discussion is particularly focussed around the problem of the determination of land rent in relation to both production and consumption. Some final comments are appended on the process of land use change.     

Approximate equilibria in microeconomic rational expectations models

For general equilibrium models in which prices transmit information among asymmetrically informed traders, strict rational expectations approximate equilibria are defined. A state-dependent price function is an ε-equilibrium if, when agents use their own information and that conveyed by prices, aggregate excess demand (in each state of the world) does not exceed ε. For any positive ε, existence requires only very mild assumptions—continuity and compact support. Moreover, there are revealing ε-equilibria for all smooth economies satisfying a dimensionality condition. In an open neighborhood of this case, existence of maximally revealing ε-equilibria holds.     

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.     

The Band Pass Filter*

We develop optimal finite‐sample approximations for the band pass filter. These approximations include one‐sided filters that can be used in real time. Optimal approximations depend upon the details of the time series representation that generates the data. Fortunately, for U.S. macroeconomic data, getting the details exactly right is not crucial. A simple approach, based on the generally false assumption that the data are generated by a random walk, is nearly optimal. We use the tools discussed here to document a new fact: There has been a significant shift in the money–inflation relationship before and after 1960.