Disclosure as a tool in stakeholder relations management: a longitudinal study on the Port of Rotterdam

This study applies stakeholder management principles to the port domain. We provide a conceptual framework for evaluating the communication strategies a (landlord) Port Authority (PA) relies on in the management of its relevant stakeholders and the adoption of disclosure to critical issues. The theoretical arguments are supported by empirical evidences from the Port of Rotterdam (PoR), i.e. a major port which leverages disclosure to successfully manage stakeholders and support the implementation of corporate strategy. The research questions are addressed using a content analysis on the annual reports (ARs) of PoR in the period 2000–2012. The overall research design enables the investigation of PA disclosure as a tool for managing the evolving interests of stakeholders from a longitudinal perspective. The PoR case shows that the relative importance of topics reported in the ARs change over time, as a result of external pressures and internal key events. The outcomes demonstrate the growing attention of PoR on topics relevant to the broader community (e.g. environment and safety/security) after a period characterised by a prominent focus on financial and governance issues. Besides, key breakthrough forces stimulating the shifts in landlord communication strategies are identified and discussed. Finally, by suggesting an indirect approach to evaluate how PA prioritises its salient stakeholders, the paper adds to extant port literature and brings methodological implications.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Copyright, Parallel Imports and National Welfare: The Australian Market for Sound Recordings

For more than a decade now there has been considerable, often heated, debate over the issue of the parallel importation of sound recordings into Australia. Citing anti-competitive monopolistic distribution, an increasingly integrated global market and the challenges of new technologies, the Australian government recently passed the Copyright Amendment Act (No.2) 1998 , which permits the parallel importation of 'non-infringing' copies of a sound recording. This paper investigates the economic rationale underpinning this regulatory change and, using a partial equilibrium model, attempts to measure the likely welfare effects on consumers, copyright owners and the nation. In addition the paper examines the likely welfare impact of piracy within the new regulatory framework. This paper demonstrates that in a global music market characterised by exclusive territorial licences and price discrimination, the removal of parallel import restrictions by a small net-importer of intellectual property may be welfare enhancing for the nation. This welfare gain is at the expense of largely foreign copyright owners.     

Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study

This paper examines the pricing behavior of securities of firms which repurchase their own shares. The results are consistent with a market in which investors price securities such that expected arbitrage profits are precluded. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive information, and that the market uses the premium, the target fraction and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement date. The observation that repurchases via tender offer are followed by abnormal increases in earnings per share and that mainly small firms engage in repurchase tender offers, provides further support for the signalling hypothesis.     

Distribution,taxation and employment in an open economy

Summary If taxes on labour income are passed on in wages the balanced budget multiplier may be negative. The present paper analyses this problem from a theoretical point of view applying a linearized version of a model for the small open economy. The model is dynamic, because account is taken of capital accumulation. Short-run and long-run solutions are expressed in terms of fiscal policy variables, a wage push variable, the price level abroad and world demand. Numerical examples are supplemented to illustrate the analytical results. Acknowledgement is due for his helpful comment to S.K. Kuipers