Historical accidents and the persistence of distributional conflicts

This paper studies a politico-economic dynamic model of endogenous growth where the political conflict focuses on the amount of resources devoted to public education. We show that if people also have the choice between investing or not investing in private human capital, multiple equilibria in growth and income distribution may arise in the long run. An inegalitarian equilibrium may coexist with an egalitarian one, the initial distribution of income completely determining which equilibrium finally is reached. We then discuss the impact of temporary political accidents such as reduced political rights on the dynamics of growth and inequality.     

Environmental performance and equilibrium

Abstract.  In this paper we show why firms' or industries' rankings in terms of environmental performance depend not only on the technology but also on market equilibrium. Between two industries committed to the same environmental constraint, the more eco-efficient is the one with the higher output level. By comparing industries and firms, we show that the rankings are not robust, for they are affected by market outcome. The role of eco-efficiency in firms' profitability in equilibrium is also scrutinized. All this shows that the usual eco-efficiency indicators are inadequate. To tackle this problem, we propose a sound indicator.     

Channels of international risk-sharing: capital gains versus income flows

Global financial integration unlocks a huge potential for international risk sharing. We examine the degree to which international equity holdings act as a risk sharing device in industrial and emerging economies. We split equity returns into investment income (dividend distribution) and capital gains to investigate which of the two channels delivers the largest potential for risk sharing. Our evidence suggests that net capital gains are a more potent channel of risk sharing. They behave in a countercyclical way, that is they tend to be positive (negative) when the domestic economy is growing more slowly (rapidly) than the rest of the world. Countries with more countercyclical net capital gains experience improved consumption risk sharing. The empirical analysis furthermore suggests that these risk sharing properties of net capital gains have increased through time, in particular in the 1990s and early-2000s, on the back of a declining equity home bias and financial market deepening.     

Transition and the output fall

We present a model to explain why in the transition economies of Central andEastern Europe an important output fall has been associated with price liberalization. Its key ingredients are search frictions and Williamsonian relation-specific investment, implying that new investments are made only after having found a new long-term partner. When all firms search for new partners, output may fall because of three effects: a) disruption of previous production links, b) a fall in investment, and c) capital depreciation due to the absence of replacement investment. We show that forms of gradual liberalization like the Chinese 'dual-track' price liberalization may avoid the transitory output fall.
JEL classification: D21, D50, E30, E61, P41, P51.     

How stock markets react to regulatory sanctions? Evidence from France

Our study of how the stock market reacts to sanction announcements by the French financial regulator from 2004 to 2017 finds that the market reacts negatively when a sanction is announced in the press. Cross-sectional regression models show that the penalties are too low to influence market reactions. Our results suggest that after the financial crisis of 2008, a plethora of news on financial wrongdoings has desensitized markets to announcements of sanctions against large companies.     

The impact of trade union membership on training in Britain

This article investigates the impact of openness and tariff reductions on the technical inventiveness of selected OECD countries. The results suggest that even these simple forms of trade liberalization may, under certain conditions, favour technical inventiveness or creativity, the most advanced form of technological gain. It is therefore likely that other, more directly relevant kinds of liberalization of exchange, will have some positive effects on less extreme forms of acquisition of technical knowledge. The diversity in outcomes across the range of countries surveyed points to the need to specify the conditions under which these dynamic technological gains can be reaped and serve as a rationale for international trade policy.     

Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are Decisions on Foreign Direct Investment Strategic Complements?

Knickerbocker (1973) introduced the notion of oligopolistic reaction to explain why firms follow rivals into foreign markets. We develop a model that incorporates central features of Knickerbocker's story—oligopoly, uncertainty, and risk aversion—to establish the conditions required to generate follow-the-leader behavior. We find that rival foreign investment will make risk-neutral firms less inclined to move abroad once its rivals have done so. We show that Knickerbocker's prediction relies on risk aversion and derive an expression for the minimum amount of risk aversion needed to generate oligopolistic reaction.     

Reputation-based pricing and price improvements

Dealers often offer price improvements, relative to posted quotes, to their clients. In this paper, we propose an explanation to this practice. We also analyze its effects on market liquidity and traders’ welfare. Enduring relationships allow dealers to avoid informed trades by offering price improvements to clients who do not trade with the dealer when they are informed. A dealer never observes whether a specific client is informed or not but he can avoid informed orders by conditioning his offers on past trading profits. Cream-skimming of uninformed order-flow increases the risk of informed trading for dealers without a relationship. Thus, authorizing price improvements increases bid-ask spreads and impairs the welfare of investors without a relationship. It may even decrease the welfare of investors who develop a relationship as they sometimes need to trade at posted quotes. The model predicts a positive relationship between (a) the price improvements granted to a specific investor and past trading profits with this investor or (b) the frequency of price improvements and bid-ask spreads.     

The trade-creating effects of business and social networks: evidence from France

Using theory-grounded estimations of trade flow equations, this paper investigates the role that business and social networks play in shaping trade between French regions. The bilateral intensity of networks is quantified using the financial structure and location of French firms and bilateral stocks of migrants. Compared to a situation without networks, migrants are shown to double bilateral trade flows, while networks of firms multiply trade flows by as much as four in some specifications. Finally, taking network effects into account divides the estimation of the impact of transport costs and of the effect of administrative borders by around three.