Additive and Multiplicative Uncertainty Revisited: What Explains the Contrasting Biases?

above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models is more realistic. Received December 14, 2001; revised version received July 16, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We thank referees for helpful comments. Ciaran Driver would like to acknowledge the research facilities from ANU, Canberra for their help in writing this paper.     

Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed “watchdogs” can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.     

Survivor Bonds: A Comment on Blake and Burrows

This article offers a critical assessment of the “survivor bonds” (SBs) proposal recently put forward by Blake and Burrows, which calls for the government to issue bonds whose coupon payments are contingent on the proportions of retirees surviving to particular ages. It suggests that the proposal has considerable merit and discusses the circumstances in which SBs would be useful risk management tools for insurance companies. It also discusses alternatives such as reinsurance, hedging with life contracts, dynamic hedging, and other forms of survivor derivative. Finally, it evaluates and rejects the argument that SBs should be issued by the state.     

Current and future changes in corporate attitudes to national identity

This commentary is a revised version of a speech that was delivered by the Honorable Thomas Harris to the Thunderbird community at the Glendale campus on February 6, 2001. Although the speech was delivered in 2001, its attendant concerns and arguments endure and are germane in today's global business considerations. Ambassador Harris is presently Her Majesty's Consul General and Director General of British Trade and Investment in the United States. Following his graduation from Cambridge University, Ambassador Harris joined the Board of Trade in 1966, and subsequently the British Diplomatic Service. His diplomatic career included stints in Tokyo, Washington, and Lagos. He has also held various appointments in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His most recent overseas posting was as British Ambassador to Korea between 1993 and 1997. He was later appointed Director General for Export Promotion in the Department of Trade and Investments (now known as British Trade International), before taking on his present assignments in New York. As Director General of British Trade and Investment, he has overall responsibility for the promotion of British trade throughout the U.S. and for securing investment by U.S. firms in the United Kingdom. In 1995, Ambassador Harris was appointed by Her Majesty, the Queen of England, to be a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (CMG). © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The 1986 U.K. Insolvency and Company Directors' Disqualification Acts: An evaluation of their impacts upon small firm financing decisions

This paper examines the potential impact of the 1986 U.K. Insolvency and Company Directors' Disqualification Acts on small firm financing decisions. With the aid of a simplified Black and Scholes (1973) option model of financing decisions, the paper illustrates how the 1986 legislation reduces the incentives for owner-managers to gamble with creditor claims, particularly in situations of financial distress, by making them personally liable for unmet claims and/or by disqualifying them from holding office for a fixed period. For instance, example 3 in the paper shows the conflict that could result from the owner-manager reducing his/her opening equity position and it further argues how the legislation should act to alleviate the situation. It remains, however, an empirical question as to whether this reduction in creditors' exposure to the risk of uncompensated wealth transfers will ultimately result in a significantly greater number of company liquidations and disqualifications, particularly during a prolonged economic downturn, or an improved/less costly supply of finance to small firms.