The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.     

Corporate environmental policy and abnormal stock price returns: An empirical investigation

This paper examines the correlation between the excess stock market returns and the adoption of an environmental protocol by companies. The underlying hypothesis that I test is whether evidence of the adoption of environmental policy, prosecution by an environmental agency or the routinized training of staff in environmental protocols, which proxies for the willingness of managers to invest for the long term, is associated with superior economic returns to shareholders. I find that both the adoption of an environmental policy and prosecution for breach of environment standards have significant explanatory power in an analysis of excess returns. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

A Comparison of Cost of Equity Estimates of Local and Global CAPMs

Cost of equity estimates are compared for three pricing models: the traditional local CAPM, the single (market) factor global CAPM, and the two‐factor global CAPM, with both market and currency index factors. For 2989 US stocks, the average difference in the cost of equity estimates is about 48 basis points between the local CAPM and the single‐factor global CAPM, and is about 61 basis points between the two global models. For 70 developed‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 76 and 47 basis points, respectively. For 48 emerging‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 57 and 70 basis points.     

From edgeworth to fisher to vickrey: A comment on Michael J. Boskin's Vickrey lecture

Irving Fisher has been overlooked as an influence on William Vickrey's work on taxation and as a link between Edgeworth and Vickrey. Vickrey was Fisher's last and greatest student.     

A Study of Arbitrage Efficiency Between the FTSE‐100 Index Futures and Options Contracts

Despite the importance of the London markets and the significance of the relationship for market makers, little published research is available on arbitrage between the FTSE‐100 Index futures and the FTSE‐100 European index options contracts. This study uses the put–call–futures parity condition to throw light on the relationship between options and futures written against the FTSE Index. The arbitrage methodology adopted in this study avoids many of the problems that have affected prior research on the relationship between options or futures prices and the underlying index. The problems that arise from nonsynchroneity between options and futures prices are reduced by the matching of options and futures prices within narrow time intervals with time‐stamped transaction data. This study allows for realistic trading and market‐impact costs. The feasibility of strategies such as execute‐and‐hold and early unwinding is examined with both ex‐post and ex‐ante simulation tests that take into consideration possible execution time lags for the arbitrage trade. This study reveals that the occurrence of matched put–call–futures trios exhibits a U‐shaped intraday pattern with a concentration at both open and close, although the magnitude of observed mispricings has no discernible intraday pattern. Ex‐post arbitrage profits for traders facing transaction costs are concentrated in at‐the‐money options. As in other major markets, despite important microstructure differences, opportunities are generally rapidly extinguished in less than 3 min. The results suggest that arbitrage opportunities for traders facing transaction costs are small in number and confirm the efficiency of trading on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:31–58, 2002     

Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.