Working While the World Sleeps: A Consideration of Sleep and Shift Work Design

The evolution of society and economic pressure has provided the impetus for operating on a 24-hr basis in many industries. This has occurred with relatively little attention toward sleep deprivation and related problems facing shift workers and the organizations employing them. This paper first documents the move toward shift work and some sleep problems associated with it. We then describe sleep disorders that impact job performance. Next, we describe alternative schedules and give suggestions for shift work implementation. Finally, we offer some normative advice regarding the treatment of shift employees.     

Exchange rate exposure and foreign exchange derivatives: do ineffective hedgers modify future derivatives use?

Recent studies examining the relationship between stock returns and exchange rate changes have provided evidence that the exchange rate exposure of non-financial companies is reduced by the use of foreign exchange derivatives. Building on such research, this study investigates whether past ineffective derivative hedging contributes to explaining future derivatives use. To the extent that companies monitor the effectiveness of their currency risk management practices, past ineffective hedgers can be expected to modify their future use of foreign exchange derivatives accordingly. In our study of 94 non-financial US multinationals, we provide evidence that the change in derivatives use from 1996–1998 to 1998–2000 can be explained in part by the ineffective hedging of currency risk in 1996–1998, controlling for variables associated with theories of optimal hedging. Additional analyses confirm that such primary results are robust to firm size, the level of foreign operations, and the use of derivatives to partially hedge currency risk. Our results imply that as exchange markets and risk management practices change, the use of derivatives to manage exchange rate risk also changes. Our contribution to this field of study is that we find evidence that past ineffective hedgers tend to increase their future use of FXDs.     

Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy

The paper analyzes environmental tax policy reform using a competitive model of world trade that includes production‐generated environmental damage (pollution) and trade tariffs. The authors examine the feasibility of Pareto‐improving multilateral reforms of environmental taxes, and show that any environmental tax reform that is mutually welfare‐improving when compensating lump‐sum transfers are assumed is also welfare‐improving when a suitable tariff reform (but no transfers) is combined with the tax changes. Several specific reform proposals are developed. These results expand the feasible set of mutually improving policy proposals for international policy initiatives.     

Productivity Growth and Some of Its Determinants in the Deregulated U.S. Railroad Industry

This study analyzes the effects of an important postderegulation innovation on rail freight productivity: the elimination of cabooses and related crew members. It also analyzes the overall growth of productivity in rail freight between 1983 and 1997 (using a translog rail cost function estimated over a sample of Class I railroads between 1983 and 1997). The results indicate that elimination of cabooses and associated crew members from freight trains reduced costs by 5-8% on the typical Class I railroad in 1997, equivalent to an annual cost saving of $2 billion to $3.3 billion for all Class I railroads. Moreover, if Class I railroads had no other technological advances since 1983, their 1997 costs (with 1997 factor prices) would have been 36-43% higher than they in fact were. Finally, the results show that overall productivity growth in rail freight did not decelerate between 1983 and 1997; if anything, it accelerated slightly.     

Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed “watchdogs” can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.