Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment

We experimentally investigate social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions on a continuous action space. We are first in comparing exogenous and endogenous ordering within one framework, which enables a direct comparison of both structures in terms of informational efficiency, strategic delay and welfare. More efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous setting and increases informational efficiency compared to an exogenous setting. However, strategic delay induces waiting costs that offset these benefits and lead to a parity of exogenous and endogenous ordering in terms of welfare results. Our results hold relevance for the efficient design of decision regimes in contexts characterized by continuous action spaces.     

Barriers Against Globalizing Corporate Ethics: An Analysis of Legal Disputes on Implementing U.S. Codes of Ethics in Germany

Global firms need to decide on the correspondence between their corporate ethics and the globalization of their activities. When firms go global, they face ethical complexities as they operate in different legal and cultural environments that may impact the admissibility and appropriateness of their approach to institutionalize and implement corporate ethics. Global firms may have good reasons to establish global codes of ethics that are to be obeyed by all employees worldwide. However, developing and implementing such codes can be rather difficult due to various, and partly competing, conditions in the countries of operation. In this article, two legal disputes are analyzed to illustrate some of the difficulties that may emerge when firms globalize their codes of ethics. I argue that these conflicts can be mitigated when firms carefully design their codes and the processes of code implementation.     

What is the best Lévy model for stock indices? A comparative study with a view to time consistency

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - Lévy models are frequently used for asset log-returns. An important criterion is the distributional assumption on the increments. Candidates...     

On the Discursive Construction of Social Entrepreneurship in Pitch Situations: The Intertextual Reproduction of Business and Social Discourse by Presenters and Their Audience

Journal of Business Ethics - This study explores the discourse of social entrepreneurs and their audiences in pitch situations. Adopting a practice perspective on social entrepreneurship, we...     

Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution

This paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games:collective vis-à-vis random fining as ameans to regulate non-pointpollution. Using samples from both Costa Ricancoffee mill managers and Costa Rican students,we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut, although they lead to efficient outcomesthrough Nash play in the majority of cases, theobserved frequency of Nash play is lower thantheoretically predicted. Moreover, we rejectthe hypothesis that managers and studentsbehave equally. Off the equilibrium, managerstend to over-abate, whereas students tend tounder-abate. This result suggests theimportance of considering subject pooldifferences in the evaluation of environmentalpolicies by means of experiments, particularlyif those policies involve certain forms ofmanagement decisions.     

Conflicting Claims and Equilibrium Adjustment Processes in a Stock-flow Consistent Macroeconomic Model

We revisit the old but still vibrant Post-Keynesian debate over ‘fully-adjusted positions’, defined by the long-run equality of actual and standard utilisation rates. The central proposition of this paper is that in a world where different groups inside and outside firms have different objectives, the equality of actual and standard utilisation should not be treated as the only possible long-run equilibrium condition. The argument is illustrated in a model of target return pricing with conflict inflation, building on the work of Marc Lavoie. A ‘common language’ for the conflicting claims by shareholders, managers and workers is developed in terms of target profit rates, and it is shown that these contradictory claims can be partly reconciled through variations in the utilisation rate. The analysis unifies history and equilibrium in the sense that the nature of final equilibrium position and the adjustment to it depend on the objectives of the dominant social groups. We distinguish a ‘Fordist regime’ and a ‘financialisation regime’ and produce simulation results within a simple stock-flow consistent model that are broadly consistent with the stylised facts of these distinct historical phases of capitalism.     

Buchbesprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung