Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

This paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology. Our analysis considers technical progress in end-of-pipe abatement and in the production technology used, thereby generalizing the approach taken by Endres et?al. (Environ Resour Econ 36:341?C366, 2007). We establish that this generalization has drastic repercussions on incentives under negligence liability, while the performance of strict liability is not compromised. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the social desirability of investment in abatement or production technology (or both) decisively determines how ex-ante and ex-post regulation fare with respect to welfare maximization in the case of negligence liability.     

Market Liberalization,Regulatory Uncertainty,and Firm Investment

This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.     

Funktionswandel der EZB?

Die Kernaufgabe der Europ?ischen Zentralbank ist es, die Preisstabilit?t zu gew?hrleisten. Die Finanz- und Staatsschuldenkrise hat der EZB die Rolle aufgezwungen, durch Notma?nahmen die Stabilit?t der W?hrungsunion zu sichern. Ihre Unabh?ngigkeit wird zunehmend dadurch gef?hrdet, dass es in diesem Prozess zu einer Verquickung von Fiskal- und Geldpolitik kommt. W ünschenswert w?re eine Rückkehr der EZB zu ihrer alten Rolle und eine Strategie, die für einen Abbau der weltweiten und europ?ischen Ungleichgewichte sorgen k?nnte.     

The ‘Neighbourhood Effect’: A multidisciplinary assessment of the case for farmer co-ordination in agri-environmental programmes

In this paper we present a multi-disciplinary analysis of the potential impacts of undertaking similar environmental actions on multiple farms in a small geographic area, using organic farming as a proxy for a co-ordinated approach. Recent papers have called for more co-ordinated efforts between farmers in terms of their environmental actions, but there has been limited applied research demonstrating the environmental benefits or the economic and social implications to farmers of this approach. Comparative analysis of biodiversity, soil and water, and farm profitability were undertaken in England on 32 matched farms in areas of low and high organic farming concentration; qualitative interviews were also conducted with 48 farmers living in two of the eight areas. Findings demonstrate higher overall levels of biodiversity on organic farms (particularly in “hotspot” areas) but this was not universal across the species groups investigated. Higher water infiltration rates were found in organic grasslands, which could prove to be a useful measure to combat flooding. In terms of the technical efficiency of producing these environmental gains, conventional and organic farms in hotspot areas demonstrated equivalent efficiency from a financial perspective. Socio-cultural research identified the different amounts of trust farmers have in their neighbours, based in part on their performance as ‘good farmers’. We discuss the neighbourhood effect with a multi-disciplinary approach and conclude that encouraging local farmer co-ordination can have clear environmental benefits without high economic cost, but must be undertaken with caution - specifically regarding the trade-offs between benefits, local geophysical and social characteristics, and assumptions made about inter-farmer trust.     

International diversification with securitized real estate and the veiling glare from currency risk

This paper analyzes diversification benefits from international securitized real estate in a mixed-asset context. We apply regression-based mean-variance efficiency tests, conditional on currency-unhedged and fully hedged portfolios to account for systematic foreign exchange movements. From the perspective of a US investor, it is shown that, first, international diversification is superior to a US mixed-asset portfolio, second, adding international real estate to an already internationally diversified stock and bond portfolio results in a further significant improvement of the risk-return trade-off and, third, considering unhedged international assets could lead to biased asset allocation decisions not realizing the true diversification benefits from international assets.     

The dramatic breakdown of the market orientation concept in the pharmaceutical industry: lessons from Vioxx

In this article we present an in-depth case study to better understand the underlying market orientation concept in relation to bringing new technologies to the marketplace. We use the case history of the anti-arthritis drug Vioxx, developed and marketed by the company Merck & Co. Inc that allegedly killed thousands of customers. The case shows how market orientation can take shape and how the key components may form an explosive cocktail prone to problematic behaviour rather than a synergistic set of orientations that creates value for customers. From the data covering 20 years, it is clear that a consumer orientation and competitor orientation, for example, are difficult to internalise and balance by employees. A competitive orientation seems to lead to tunnel vision regarding profit and market share outcomes. Implications for the fundamental market orientation concept, innovation management, together with management challenges are discussed.     

One-sided bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

I consider a bargaining game in which only one player can make proposals and the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is like a situation where: (i) a CEO suggests a possible hire, who must be okayed by a board of directors, or (ii) the US president nominates a potential judge, who must be okayed by the Senate. My main result is an algorithm that finds the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. The number of steps in the algorithm is on the order of $n$, the number of possibilities (e.g., applicants to a job) that the bargainers may consider. By contrast, if one uses backwards induction to solve the game, then the number of steps is on the order of $n!$. A corollary of the main result, similar to some results of previous bargaining models, is that the wait costs of only one player, the non-proposer, is relevant to the outcome. The wait costs of the proposer are irrelevant, provided that they are positive. Applied to the nomination process specified by the US Constitution, the corollary suggests that only the Senate's wait costs are relevant to the outcome—the president's wait costs are irrelevant. As I argue, this result may explain a little-noticed regularity of American politics. This is that the Senate seems to have much influence in the selection of lower-court judges but relatively little influence in the selection of Supreme Court justices.