Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Cross-Listings and Home Market Trading Volume: The Case of Malaysia and Singapore

Cross‐listings of equities internationally are becoming more common. Using data for Europe and North America, previous studies reject the order flow diversion hypothesis, which states that international cross‐listings reduce home‐country trading volume. We test this hypothesis using data for equities cross‐listed in Singapore and Malaysia. We find that trading volume in Malaysia fell 42.9% when Singapore markets were closed for holidays. Furthermore, we show that trading volume in Malaysia did not increase following the implementation of regulations that ended the trading of Malaysian equities in Singapore in 1998. Hence, we reject the order flow diversion hypothesis.     

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

美联储救助次贷危机的创新及对我国央行应对危机的启示

目前，全球金融体系变化的突出特征是金融体系正在由银行主导转向市场主导。这种金融结构的演进导致了金融危机的性质和区域都发生了变化。面对这种变化，关联储在次贷危机的形成过程中没有及时识别系统中的风险，未能阻止危机的爆发。不过在危机爆发后，关联储在传统救助政策的基础上发展了新的政策手段，缓解了金融市场压力。本文通过对关联储救助过程的解读，全面分析其危机管理政策，并结合我国的实际情况，提出对策建议。     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.