Leverage regulation: An agent-based simulation

An agent-based financial market model is used to simulate the effects of financial regulation to reduce financial leverage. Results suggest that regulating leverage using margin calls can lead to less frequent financial crises per century, however, it creates harder hit financial crises than without regulation. In addition, regulation where the central authority tries to prick bubbles also leads to less frequent financial crises, but, creates greater volatility. Lastly, I find that leverage regulation where agent’s ability to borrow is not dependent on price produces less frequent crises and less volatility than the other regimes.     

The Impact of Generic Advertising on U.S. Household Cheese Purchases: A Censored Autocorrelated Regression Approach

The impacts of generic cheese advertising on U.S. household cheese purchases are examined via the use of a unique household panel. Modest gains in overall at-home cheese purchases from generic cheese advertising appear to be largely the result of strong gains in purchases of natural cheese rather than processed cheese. Results indicate that relatively larger gains in household cheese purchases from generic advertising may be realized by targeting infrequent purchasers to increase purchase frequencies, rather than by targeting households in general to increase their conditional purchase levels.     

TAIL FORECASTING WITH MULTIVARIATE BAYESIAN ADDITIVE REGRESSION TREES

We develop multivariate time-series models using Bayesian additive regression trees that posit nonlinearities among macroeconomic variables, their lags, and possibly their lagged errors. The error variances can be stable, feature stochastic volatility, or follow a nonparametric specification. We evaluate density and tail forecast performance for a set of U.S. macroeconomic and financial indicators. Our results suggest that the proposed models improve forecast accuracy both overall and in the tails. Another finding is that when allowing for nonlinearities in the conditional mean, heteroskedasticity becomes less important. A scenario analysis reveals nonlinear relations between predictive distributions and financial conditions.     

The value of the floor

Existing theoretical literature suggests that floor trading has discernable benefits over electronic trading. In particular floor relationships lead to a reduction in asymmetric information and hence lower spreads. The ability of floor brokers to participate in incoming order flow without revealing their supply and demand curves increases total liquidity and dampens liquidity shocks leading to lower volatility. We develop hypotheses and test them on a sample of stocks that switch from floor trading to an electronic system with fairly identical rules and pre-trade transparency. We find strong support for existing theory and our hypotheses. In particular asymmetric information and volatility are significantly higher on the electronic system. This leads to an increase in investor transaction costs which dwarfs the operational cost advantages of the electronic systems. Our results are robust to tests involving samples that control for company specific factors and market wide trends.     

How costly is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the effects of the Act on corporate profitability

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was intended to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. However, critics have argued that the costs of SOX far outweigh its intended benefits. Prior studies based on stock-price reactions to SOX-related events document mixed evidence on the expected impact of SOX. In contrast, we provide evidence on the net realized costs of SOX by examining its impact on operating profitability. We find that average cash flows decline by 1.3% of total assets after SOX. These costs are more significant for smaller firms, for more complex firms, and for firms with lower-growth opportunities. Annually, these costs range from $6 million for smaller firms to $39 million for larger firms. Further, we document that net SOX-related costs are not limited to one-time expenses associated with internal-control design and implementation. In aggregate, for the 1428 firms in our sample, these costs amount to about $19 billion per year. Profitability is lower for up to four years post-SOX. To our knowledge, ours are the first estimates of the realized net costs imposed by SOX.     

Limited participation and consumption-saving puzzles: A simple explanation and the role of insurance

In this paper, we show that the existence of a large, negative wealth shock and insufficient insurance against such a shock could explain both the limited stock market participation puzzle and the low-consumption–high-savings puzzle. We then conduct an empirical analysis on the relation between household portfolio choices and access to private insurance and various types of government safety nets. The empirical results demonstrate that a lack of insurance against large, negative wealth shocks is positively correlated with lower participation rates and higher saving rates. Overall, the evidence suggests an important role of insurance in household investment and savings decisions.     

Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation

This paper presents a three-stage proactive game involving terrorists, elected policymakers, and voters. In each of two targeted countries, a representative voter chooses an elected policymaker, charged with deciding proactive countermeasures to ameliorate a transnational terrorist threat. Two primary considerations drive the voters' strategic choice: free riding on the other countries' countermeasures and limiting a reprisal terrorist attack. The resulting low proactive countermeasures benefit the terrorists, whose attacks successfully exploit voters' strategic actions. This finding stems from a delegation problem where leadership by voters has a detrimental consequence on the well-being of targeted countries. Domestic politics add another layer of concern when addressing a common terrorist threat.