Why "good jobs" are good for retailers

Too many retail managers believe that they must offer bad jobs to keep prices low. As a result, almost one-fifth of American workers suffer low wages, poor benefits, constantly changing schedules, and few opportunitie for advancement. The author's research reveals, however, that the presumed trade-off between investment in employees and low prices is false. To meet short-term performance targets, many retailers cut labor. The unmotivated and poorly trained employees who remain often cannot keep up with their tasks in a complex operating environment. The result is a vicious cycle, in which lower sales and profits tempt managers to cut even more employees. Retailers such as QuikTrip, Mercadona, Trader Joe's, and Costco instead create a virtuous cycle of investment in employees, stellar operational execution, higher sales and profits, and larger labor budgets. They also make work more efficient and fulfilling for employees, improve customer service, and boost sales and profits through four practices: simplify operations by offering fewer products and promotions, train employees to perform multiple tasks, eliminate waste in everything but staffing, and let employees make some decisions.     

Pension Funds’ Asset Allocation and Participant Age: A Test of the Life‐Cycle Model

This article examines the impact of participants’ age distribution on the asset allocation of Dutch pension funds, using a unique data set of pension fund investment plans for 2007. Theory predicts a negative effect of age on (strategic) equity exposures. We observe that a 1‐year higher average age in active participants leads to a significant and robust reduction of the strategic equity exposure by around 0.5 percentage point. Larger pension funds show a stronger age‐equity exposure effect. The average age of active participants influences investment behavior more strongly than the average age of all participants, which is plausible as retirees no longer possess any human capital.     

On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point $x$ of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point $y$ of the polytope such that $x$ is the unique point of the polytope at maximal distance from $y$ . It is proved that if the polytope does not have either exactly two single-best points or exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, then any Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rule is dictatorial. If the polytope has exactly two single-best points, then there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules, which can be described by committee voting (simple games) between the two single-best points. This also holds if there are exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, but in that case, we limit ourselves to describing an example of such a rule. The framework under consideration models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region.     

A note on the energy-efficiency investments of an expected cost minimizer

This paper analyzes a consumer's choice between a high-efficiency and a low-efficiency version of an energy-using durable when the expected lifetimes of the two versions differ. A (small) difference in expected lifetimes may induce entirely different implications for the behavior of a cost minimizing consumer, as compared to the case with equal expected lifetimes. The result supplements the explanations for the extremely high discount rates that have been reported for energy efficiency investments. We also provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a reservation property, both in the case of deterministic and of random lifetimes.     

Pension Benefit Security: A Comparison of Solvency Requirements,a Pension Guarantee Fund,and Sponsor Support

Developed countries apply different security mechanisms in regulation to protect pension benefits: solvency requirements, a pension guarantee fund (PGF), and sponsor support. We compare these mechanisms for a generalized form of hybrid pension schemes. We calculate the expected log return for the beneficiaries, the shortfall probability, that is, the likelihood of the pension payment falling below the promised level and the expected loss given shortfall. Comparing solvency requirements to a pension guarantee system or sponsor support involves trading off risk and return. Additional spending on default insurance reduces the shortfall probability and the expected loss given shortfall but also lowers the probability of high positive returns as are feasible under solvency requirements.     

Options and earnings announcements: an empirical study of volatility, trading volume, open interest and liquidity

In this paper we study the impact of earnings announcements on implied volatility, trading volume, open interest and spreads in the stock options market. We find that implied volatility increases before announcement days and drops afterwards. Also option trading volume is higher around announcement days. During the days before the announcement open interest tends to increase, while it returns to regular levels afterwards. Changes in the quoted spread largely respond to higher trading volume and changes in implied volatility. The effective spread increases on the event day and on the first two days following the earnings announcement.     

What Drives Pension Indexation in Turbulent Times? An Empirical Examination of Dutch Pension Funds

This paper identifies the key factors influencing indexation decisions in turbulent economic times within defined benefit plans using a unique panel dataset of 166 Dutch pension funds from 2007 to 2010. Key drivers of indexation are the funding ratio, inflation and real wage growth. The type of pension fund and the interest rate exposure are also statistically significant, although the latter effect is nonlinear. The asset allocation has no significant effect on the level of provided indexation as this is already captured by the funding ratio. We also examine the relation between policy ladders and the actual level of provided indexation. This study finds that a policy ladder with an upper limit equal to a 100 % real funding ratio is able to predict the actual level of indexation more accurately than a ladder with an upper limit based on a pension fund’s required nominal funding ratio. The latter tends to overestimate the actual level of indexation.     

Multi-source Statistics: Basic Situations and Methods

Many National Statistical Institutes (NSIs), especially in Europe, are moving from single-source statistics to multi-source statistics. By combining data sources, NSIs can produce more detailed and more timely statistics and respond more quickly to events in society. By combining survey data with already available administrative data and Big Data, NSIs can save data collection and processing costs and reduce the burden on respondents. However, multi-source statistics come with new problems that need to be overcome before the resulting output quality is sufficiently high and before those statistics can be produced efficiently. What complicates the production of multi-source statistics is that they come in many different varieties as data sets can be combined in many different ways. Given the rapidly increasing importance of producing multi-source statistics in Official Statistics, there has been considerable research activity in this area over the last few years, and some frameworks have been developed for multi-source statistics. Useful as these frameworks are, they generally do not give guidelines to which method could be applied in a certain situation arising in practice. In this paper, we aim to fill that gap, structure the world of multi-source statistics and its problems and provide some guidance to suitable methods for these problems.