Independent Collective Representation: Providing Effectiveness, Fairness, and Democracy in the Employment Relationship

Protection against arbitrary management action has always been a concern of employees. Enlightened managerialism has been one approach to addressing these concerns. This approach is compromised by the conflicts of interest that characterize the employment relationship in a market system. We argue in this paper that independent collective representation functions to protect employees while leaving the employer with sufficient freedom to manage. Trade unions, as a counter weight to the exercise of absolute managerial power, complement a pluralist democratic system. The exercise of absolute power, the absence of accountability and countervailing checks and balances, are foreign to any democratic polity. At enterprise level, trade unions manage the ongoing tensions and conflicts between democratic humanistic values and market values.     

Education and income of the states of the United States: 1840–2000

This article introduces original annual average years of schooling measures for each state from 1840 to 2000. Our methodology results in state estimates similar to those reported in the United States Census from 2000 back to 1940 and national, turn of the century estimates strikingly close to those presented by Schultz (Schultz, T. (1961). In N. B. Henry (Ed.), Social forces influencing American education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.) and Fishlow (Fishlow, A. (1966). In H. Rosovsky (Ed.), Industrialization in two systems. John Wiley & Sons). To further determine the validity of our state schooling estimates, we first combine original data on real state per worker output with existing data to provide a more comprehensive series of real state output per worker from 1840 to 2000. We then estimate aggregate Mincerian earnings regressions and discover that the return to a year of schooling for the average individual in a state ranges from 11% to 15%. This range is robust to various time periods, various estimation methods, various assumptions about the endogeneity of schooling and is in line with the body of evidence from the labor literature. All views expressed here are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.     

JAMES WATT AS INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLIST: COMMENT ON BOLDRIN AND LEVINE*

In their 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture, Michele Boldrin and David Levine argue that intellectual property rights may be damaging to social welfare. As empirical evidence for their theory they offer James Watt's steam engine patent, claiming that it delayed the Industrial Revolution by as much as two decades. We show that this claim, as well as the more general claim that Watt's story supports Boldrin and Levine's theory, rests upon a distorted summary of the historical record.     

Does history repeat itself? Economic development and policy convergence in Vietnam and South Korea

With one of the world's fastest rates of economic growth since the 1990s, Vietnam could be seen as Asia's next tiger economy. This study examines whether there has been policy convergence between the older East Asian developmental state model of economic development and that adopted by Vietnam. The economic development trajectories of South Korea and Vietnam are compared to identify similarities and differences. It was found that while policy convergence is evident there is also some divergence between the two countries.     

Stimulating Growth and Investment in Africa: From Macro to Micro Reforms

Abstract: How do we stimulate investment and growth in Africa? This paper focuses on low‐income countries that are ‘good performers’ and not especially endowed with natural resources. Many of these countries have undertaken a set of economic reforms, and have recorded growth rates in per capita GDP of around 5 percent over the past 10 years. But some constraints to growth persist. We look at three things — how business environments create ‘external costs’ for firms and inhibit performance, how investors perceive the constraints to doing business, and the role of political economy factors especially in those countries with lagging indigenous business sectors. Our analysis of investment climate and other data leads us to several recommendations for governments, donors and the private sector itself, including the following: deepen macro reforms; build a strong, unified business forum; create incentives for more responsive governments; and improve risk mitigation and broaden this to domestic investors.