Halal Certification for Financial Products: A Transaction Cost Perspective

We argue that although halal certification could potentially reduce the high transaction costs related to buying Islamic financial products, in practice these costs are just replaced by transaction costs relating to the certification itself. It takes considerable time (2–3 months) and money (USD 122.000) to obtain a halal certification. Partially, this is because the market is highly concentrated and non-contestable. About 20 individual Sharia scholars control more than half the market, with the top 3 earning an estimated USD 4.5 million in fees per year. Moreover, this market seems plagued with problems, most notably a strong incentive for excessively lenient certification, lack of consensus on what is considered halal and sub-standard governance practices. We discuss solutions to these problems and conclude that a neutral non-profit government entity should assume the role of halal certifiers.     

Two‐Way Migration between Similar Countries

We develop a model to explain two‐way migration of high‐skilled individuals between countries that are similar in their economic characteristics. High‐skilled migration results from the combination of workers whose abilities are private knowledge, and a production technology that gives incentives to firms for hiring workers of similar ability. In the presence of migration cost, high‐skilled workers self‐select into the group of migrants. The laissez‐faire equilibrium features too much migration, explained by a negative migration externality. We also show that for sufficiently low levels of migration cost the optimal level of migration, while smaller than in the laissez‐faire equilibrium, is strictly positive. Finally, we extend our model into different directions to capture stylised facts in the data and show that our baseline results also hold in these more complex modelling environments.     

Regional characteristics,opportunity perception and entrepreneurial activities

This article seeks to better understand the link between regional characteristics and individual entrepreneurship. We combine individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data for Western Germany with regional-level data, using multilevel analysis to test our hypotheses. We find no direct link between regional knowledge creation, the economic context and an entrepreneurial culture on the one side and individual business start-up intentions and start-up activity on the other side. However, our findings point to the importance of an indirect effect of regional characteristics as knowledge creation, the economic context and an entrepreneurial culture have an effect on the individual perception of founding opportunities, which in turn predicted start-up intentions and activity.     

The Selectiveness of the Entrepreneurial Process

This paper focuses on the phase before a firm is founded. Based upon cross‐sectional data from the German section of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, the specific aims of the paper are to shed some light on the selection that takes place during the entrepreneurial process and to explain empirically the demographic and cognitive characteristics of (potential) entrepreneurs. The results reveal significant differences between common determinants of the different phases of the entrepreneurial process.     

An Investigation of Children's Ability to Identify Sponsors and Understand Sponsorship Intentions

Sponsorship has become an important tool for companies that target children with their market offerings. Despite growing firm interest in assessing sponsorship effectiveness and public concern about the effects on children, research to date has not investigated how sponsorship functions for children. This article addresses both issues by examining children's perceptions of sponsors (i.e., ability to identify sponsors in different conditions) and their perceptions of sponsorship (i.e., ability to understand sponsorship intentions). Because prior research on these issues is scarce, the conceptual reasoning relies on findings from advertising literature pertaining to children and sponsorship literature. An empirical study features sponsorships in a theme park for children. The results reveal implications for managers and public policymakers, as well as avenues for further research.     

Structural change and environmental impact

Although structural change in many industrialized countries has increased since the early 1970s, the environmental policy aspects of this change have hardly been investigated. Using a set of four indicators, this study examines the correlation between structural changes and environmental pollution in thirty-one Eastern and Western industrialized countries from 1970 to 1985.     

Fairness,trade, and inequality

We develop a model of international trade between two symmetric countries that features inter-group inequality between managers and workers, and also intra-group inequality within each of those two groups. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their managerial ability, and firms run by more able managers have a higher productivity level and make higher profits. There is rent sharing at the firm level due to fair wage preferences of workers, and hence firms with higher profits pay higher wages in equilibrium in order to elicit their workers' full effort. We show that in this framework international trade leads to a self-selection of the best firms into export status, with exporting firms having to pay a wage premium. Aggregate welfare increases, but there is also larger inequality along multiple dimensions: Involuntary unemployment and income inequality between managers and workers increase, and so does inequality within these two subgroups of individuals, as measured by the respective Gini coefficients.     

Pigouvian Taxes Under Imperfect Competition If Consumption Depends on Emissions

The paper considers environmental regulation of a consumption good and an externality which influence demand and costs in a nonseparable way. Under monopoly two instruments are always required for first-best. The Pigouvian tax is more complicated than anticipated.