Services and consumer protection the proposed Swedish consumer services act

The Nordic countries are at present preparing a regulation of consumer services contracts. Proposals for comprehensive Consumer Services Acts have been submitted by Governmental Committees in Sweden and Norway. The author, himself Chairman of the Swedish committee, reports about the Swedish proposals which soon may become applicable law. They will cover most service contracts with the exception of insurance and professional services. The Act will be of a private law character and regulate the performance of and liability for the contract in a mandatory way. The consumer's position in service contracts will be improved in many respects, and these are outlined in some detail in the paper.

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Eine schwedische Gesetzesvorlage zur Verbesserung des Verbraucherschutzes bei Dienstleistungen

Zusammenfassung Die intensive verbraucherpolitische Gesetzgebung der Nordischen Staaten — Schweden, Dänemark, Norwegen, Finnland — war bislang auf Handelspraktiken, Verbraucherkredit, Haftungsfragen und Kaufrecht konzentriert. Dienstverträge waren bislang nur sehr lückenhaft geregelt, obwohl erhebliche Werte umgeschlagen werden.Inzwischen hat eine schwedische Regierungskommission, die vom Autor dieses Beitrages geleiter wurde, ebenso wie eine norwegische Kommission einen umfassenden Gesetzgebungsvorschlag für Konsumentendienstverträge vorgelegt. Die Kommission beschreitet dabei bewußt rechtspolitisches Neuland.Der Beitrag geht auf die wichtigsten Vorschläge der Kommission ein, die weitgehend schon öffentliche Zustimmung gefunden haben und vermutlich zu einer entsprechenden legislativen Initiative führen. Das Gesetz wird nicht alle Dienstleistungen erfassen, etwa nicht Versicherungen, die einer besonderen gesetzlichen Regelung unterliegen, und Arztverträge. Zentraler Regelungsgegenstand sind Werkverträge (Reparaturverträge) an beweglichen Sachen und Gebäuden.Folgende Einzelvorschläge der Kommission verdienen besondere Beachtung: Werbeaussagen des Unternehmers, etwa über die Qualität seiner Dienstleistungen, werden grundsätzlich Vertragsinhalt und lösen bei Täuschung entsprechende Vertragssanktionen aus. Der Verbraucher kann den Vertrag jederzeit widerrufen, wenn das Werk noch nicht fertiggestellt ist, muß aber die geleisteten Dienste vergüten. Ausführlich und zwingend werden die Verzugsfolgen und die Gewährleistungshaftung des Unternehmers geregelt. Die Gewährleistungshaftung setzt eine entsprechende Anzeige des Konsumenten voraus, die spätestens zwei Jahre nach Gefahrübergang, bei unerkennbaren Mängeln auch länger, erfolgen muß. Bei Mängeln hat der Konsument ein kostenloses Nachbesserungsrecht. Unter bestimmten Umständen — nämlich Vertragsbruch durch Verzug oder gravierende Mängel — hat der Kunde ein Kündigungsrecht. Bei weniger gravierenden Mängeln kann der Konsument Minderung verlangen, sofern der Unternehmer nicht den Mangel beseitigt.Das Recht des Konsumenten auf Schadenersatz wird erweitert und in seiner Durchsetzungsmöglichkeit durch Beweislastregeln erleichtert. Es tritt grundsätzlich neben die sonstigen Rechtsbehelfe auf Nachbesserung, Kündigung und Minderung. Die Vorschläge regeln auch die Schadensberechnung, wobei im Verzugsfall vernünftige Pauschalen vereinbart werden können. Die Regelungen sollen zugunsten des Kunden zwingend sein.Schließlich enthält der Entwurf noch Vorschläge über Rechtsfolgen bei Verzug des Konsumenten mit seiner Leistung. Hier wird ein gerechter Interessenausgleich zwischem dem Zahlungs- und dem Ersatzanspruch des Unternehmers einerseits und dem Schutzanliegen des Konsumenten, insbesondere gegenüber übermäßig belastenden Verzugsfolgen, andererseits versucht.

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Ulf Bernitz is Professor of Private Law, Institute for Intellectual Property and Market Law, University of Stockholm, Fack, S-106 91 Stockholm 50, Sweden. From July 1980 he holds a chair of Consumer and Market Law at the same University. Parts of this paper appear also in the English language summary of the Swedish Government Official Report listed under References.     

Test–Retest Reliability of Choice Experiments in Environmental Valuation

The paper presents the results of the first test–retest study on choice experiments in environmental valuation. In a survey concerning landscape externalities of onshore wind power in central Germany, respondents answered the same five choice sets at two different points in time. Each choice set comprised three alternatives described by five attributes, and the time interval between the test and the retest was eleven months. The analysis takes place at three different levels, investigating choice consistency at the choice task level and repeatability of the latent construct utility at the level of parametric models as well as at the level of willingness-to-pay estimates. At the choice task level we observed 59?% identical choices. The parametric analysis shows that the test and retest estimates are not equal, even when we control for scale, that is, differences in the error variance. However, comparing the marginal willingness-to-pay estimates among test and retest reveals only a statistically significant difference for one of the attributes. Overall, this indicates a moderate test–retest reliability taking into account that consistency at the choice task level overlooks the stochastic nature of the process underlying discrete choice experiments.     

Option Contracts in Supply Chains

This paper considers optimal contracts in supply chains that consist of   n ≥ 2  firms and face a potential investment hold-up problem. We show that option contracts may solve the incentive problems. First, we provide case-study evidence for the use of option contracts in the semiconductor industry. As our second contribution, we generalize the earlier option contract approach by introducing continuous quantities. Third, we extend the setting to n parties. For long supply chains, the first-best allocation can be achieved if there is a particular order of renegotiations .     

Robust monetary policy in a small open economy

We study how a central bank in a small open economy should conduct monetary policy if it fears that its model is misspecified. Using a new-Keynesian model of a small open economy, we solve analytically for the optimal robust policy rule and the equilibrium dynamics, and we separately analyze the consequences of central bank robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, output, and the exchange rate. We show that an increase in the preference for robustness makes the central bank respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification.     

Preferences of Scotch malt whisky consumers for changes in pesticide use and origin of barley

In a case study related to Scotch malt whisky production, this study analyses consumers’ perceptions and preferences regarding two aspects that have emerged in the debate on sustainable production and consumption, and on environmentally responsible food choice, namely (i) the use of pesticides in agriculture, and (ii) the provenance of food ingredients. We carried out a choice experiment to investigate preferences and estimate Willingness to Pay of Scotch malt whisky consumers for pesticide use restrictions and the potential impact on the production of one of its essential ingredients, barley. Using latent class models, we find that about half of the respondents are non-demanders with respect to both attributes, and only a third of the sample population are willing to pay for further pesticide restrictions. Demand for more environmentally responsible production of Scotch malt whisky is therefore limited, indicating that in the case of Scotch malt whisky, consumers are not likely to be key to driving sustainable production. With respect to barley provenance, being able to claim a 100% Scottish product could be a plausible commercial option for some producers to pursue in a competitive market. Methodologically, the scale-adjusted latent class model proved to be successful in uncovering preference heterogeneity and its sources, in including non-demanders in the analysis and in accounting for differences in scale amongst respondents.     

Cost-based transfer pricing

This paper compares the performance of alternative cost-based transfer pricing methods. We adopt an incomplete contracting framework with asymmetric information at the trading stage. Transfer pricing guides intra-company trade and provides incentives for value-enhancing specific investments. We compare actual-cost transfer prices that include a markup over marginal costs with standard-cost transfer prices that are determined either by the central office ex ante (centralized standard-cost transfer pricing) or by the supplying division at the trading stage (reported standard-cost transfer pricing). For the actual-cost methods, we show that markups based on the joint contribution margin (contribution-margin transfer pricing) dominate purely additive markups (cost-plus transfer pricing). We obtain the following results. (1) Centralized standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face low cost uncertainty. (2) The actual-cost methods dominate the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face high cost uncertainty and later, at the trading stage, the buying division receives sufficient cost information. (3) Reported standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face high cost uncertainty, and the buyer has insufficient cost information at the trading stage.     

Co‐owned Local Government Organisations: Conditions for Strategy Development

Local governments tend to join resources and create co‐owned organisations to solve the supply of public services. From a strategic perspective on local government cooperation, this paper analyses the conditions for strategy development in a co‐owned municipal organisation. The empirical data stem from a longitudinal case study of a Swedish provider of water and sewerage services. We show that difficulties in formulating and agreeing upon strategies are not dependent on the structural form. Instead, there is an intrinsic dilemma when municipalities are to create a joint strategy at the same time as each municipality is sovereign to decide on all local matters.