Teaching the Golden Rule

The Golden Rule is endorsed in oneform or another by most cultures and majorreligions and is still espoused byphilosophers, business ethicists, and popularbusiness authors. Because it also resonateswith undergraduate business majors, it can bean effective teaching tool. This paperdescribes a way of teaching the Golden Rulethrough a series of business-oriented examplesintended to bring out its strengths andweaknesses. The method described alsointroduces students to some basic moralreasoning skills and acquaints them with a widerange of moral issues that arise in business. Kant's Formula of Humanity is discussed in thefinal section as a principle that overcomes atleast some of the Golden Rule's defects.     

A Critique of the Legal and Philosophical Case for Rent Control

Rent control is an economic abomination. It diverts investments away from residential rent units, it leads to their deterioration, it is responsible for urban decay such as in the South Bronx, it does not help poor tenants, it is a horrendous means of income redistribution. Yet this economic regulation is beloved of intellectuals (hot beds of pro rent control sentiment are Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Cambridge) particularly in the legal and philosophical communities. The present article is dedicated to an exploration and rejection of the arguments in behalf of rent control which emanate from this source.     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

A Nonstandard Approach to Option Pricing

Nonstandard probability theory and stochastic analysis, as developed by Loeb, Anderson, and Keisler, has the attractive feature that it allows one to exploit combinatorial aspects of a well-understood discrete theory in a continuous setting. We illustrate this with an example taken from financial economics: a nonstandard construction of the well-known Black-Scholes option pricing model allows us to view the resulting object at the same time as both (the hyperfinite version of) the binomial Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model (that is, a hyperfinite geometric random walk) and the continuous model introduced by Black and Scholes (a geometric Brownian motion). Nonstandard methods provide a means of moving freely back and forth between the discrete and continuous points of view. This enables us to give an elementary derivation of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula from the corresponding formula for the binomial model. We also devise an intuitive but rigorous method for constructing self-financing hedge portfolios for various contingent claims, again using the explicit constructions available in the hyperfinite binomial model, to give the portfolio appropriate to the Black-Scholes model. Thus, nonstandard analysis provides a rigorous basis for the economists' intuitive notion that the Black-Scholes model contains a built-in version of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model.     

CAN INEFFICIENT TRADERS CREATE VALUE?

I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment.     

Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules

Previous research has developed a representation for the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and negative plurality rules on three candidates for large electorates under the impartial culture condition. This study considers the two stage voting rules on three candidates, plurality elimination and negative plurality elimination. A representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of each for large electorates under impartial culture. The Condorcet efficiencies of both rules are equal and are shown to be substantially greater than the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and negative plurality.